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                                                          ABSTRACT  
This thesis examines three essays in earnings management using UK-based data samples. 
The first essay implements a first test of the debt covenant hypothesis for the UK. The 
results indicate that firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage 
(debt to EBITDA) covenants engage in higher levels of RAM relative to firms far from 
violation. Mandatory IFRS adoption does not change the use of RAM for firms close to 
violation or in technical default of their interest coverage covenants. However, it increases 
the propensity for employing RAM for firm close to default of their debt to EBITDA 
covenants. The second essay examines the effect of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on the 
debt covenant hypothesis. It finds that the use of RAM to avoid the possibility of interest 
coverage covenant violations decreases from the pre-issue period to the post-issue period. 
The results also show that the decrease in the use of RAM in the post SEO period to avoid 
the likelihood of breaching interest coverage covenant is more pervasive among SEO firms 
with low market to book ratios or high financial leverage. The third and final essay 
investigates revenue reclassification as an earnings management tool. More specifically, it 
examines whether firms use revenue reclassification by shifting other revenues to core 
revenues. The results establish that firms engage in revenue reclassification to inflate core 
revenues. They indicate that the period following mandatory IFRS adoption is associated 
with an increase in this practice as IRFS offers more latitude for revenue reclassification. 
Further tests reveal that revenue reclassification is more pervasive among firms with high 
incentives for earnings management such as those conducting seasoned equity offerings, 
those in financial distress, those with acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and 
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1.1 Background and research questions 
Accounting has been treated as the language of business because it provides the firm’s 
external users with financial information. Using this, stakeholders can analyze the firm’s 
operating and financial performances to help them in decision making process. This 
information can be found in companies’ financial reports that are prepared by managers 
based on accounting standards. The latter are designed to ensure that financial reports are 
made transparently and fairly. Accounting standards, however, allow managers discretion 
which may lead to opportunistic behaviour.  
Managers can use discretion opportunistically to manage earnings.  According to Healy 
and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. The literature 
especially identifies two main sets of motives as to why firms managing earnings 
opportunistically (Dechow and Skinner 2000; Fields, Lys, and Vincent 2001; Walker 2013). 
These are the contracting and capital market motives.  
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The debt contracts of the firm and the compensation contracts of a firm’s executives are 
examined as the contracting motives for earnings management in the literature. Banks 
impose conditions on loans via covenants that set out minimum or maximum threshold 
values. Violations of these by firms could ultimately result in the loans being recalled or the 
firms being placed in receivership. The debt-covenant hypothesis argues that those firms that 
are more susceptible to violating covenants inflate earnings because violation is costly 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Several studies confirm that debt covenant violations are 
costly. Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) document that violating 
debt covenants leads to a decrease in a firm’s future investment. Roberts and Sufi (2009) 
find that debt covenant violations increase a firm’s interest costs and decrease the 
availability of credit. Several studies using US debt contracting have investigated whether 
firms engage in earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations. Earlier studies 
mainly use the debt-equity ratio as a proxy for the tightness of debt covenants because of the 
costly nature of obtaining accounting-based debt covenant information (e.g. Lilien and 
Pastena 1982; Daley and Vigeland 1983; Ayres 1986; Zimmer 1986). Subsequent studies use 
actual debt contract information to test the debt-covenant hypothesis (DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994; Sweeney 1994; Dichev and Skinner 2002; Franz, HassabElnaby, and Lobo 2014). The 
findings of these studies generally support the debt-covenant hypothesis. 
Early papers document that CEO bonus plan as a compensation contract is the leading 
incentive for executives to manipulate earnings (Healy 1985; Gaver, Gaver, and Austin 
1995; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan 1995; Murphy 2000). Healy (1985) states executives 
try to maximize their short term bonus compensation by using discretionary accruals. 
According to Murphy (2000), those firms which set bonus payout standards internally 
smooth their earnings more than those firms which set bonus payout standards externally. 
The separation of ownership and control poses some problems such as agency conflict which 
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leads managers not to act in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Thus, corporations try to find remedies to this problem and, as one solution, they change the 
structure of executive compensation. In particular, the use of stock options as executive 
compensation increased significantly in late 1990s. This, however, has not deterred 
managers’ opportunistic behavior. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that when CEOs’ 
compensation is mainly based on stock and option holdings they use discretionary accruals 
aggressively to increase their reported earnings, in line with Cheng and Warfield (2005).  
Firms also manage earnings to inflate share prices due to capital market motives. This is 
more pervasive around corporate events. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) and Morsfield and 
Tan (2006) find that US firms use earnings management in the year before and during initial 
public offerings to boost the issue price. However, this is not supported by the similar UK-
based study (Ball and Shivakumar 2006). This work around seasoned equity offerings 
(hereafter SEOs) provides conclusive findings that firms overestimate earnings in the issue 
year (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998b; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Earnings management also 
occurs around mergers and acquisitions specifically among firms that use their stocks for an 
acquisition (e.g. Botsari and Meeks 2008). Furthermore, extant studies show that firms 
manage earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts for earning a stock return premium 
(Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Daske, Gebhardt, and McLeay 2006; Gore, Pope, and 
Singh 2007).   
This thesis comprises three essays in earnings management using UK-based data 
samples. The first (Chapter 2) implements a first test of the debt covenant hypothesis for the 
UK. This hypothesis argues that those firms that are more susceptible to violating covenants 
inflate earnings (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  Specifically, Chapter 2 examines whether 
UK firms manage earnings to avoid debt covenant violations. The extant studies have tested 
the debt covenant hypothesis in the context of the USA. Chapter 3 investigates whether 
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SEOs affect the debt covenant hypothesis. The latter is likely to be affected by this corporate 
event but this has not been tested in the literature. Finally, Chapter 4 is the first to examine 
revenue reclassification as an earnings management tool. It tests whether firms shift other 
revenues to core revenues and whether this behavior changes after IFRS adoption. 
1.2 Motivation for the research  
Several factors motivate this research. First, the debt covenant hypothesis is mainly 
tested using small or large US samples. US researchers find that debt covenants are very 
common in loan contracts (Roberts and Sufi 2009; Demerjian 2011) and that firms use 
earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations (Dichev and Skinner 2002; Franz et 
al. 2014). UK studies (Citron 1992; Moir and Sudarsanam 2007) do not directly test the debt 
covenant hypothesis but their evidence on covenants is consistent with US studies. UK 
studies do not test the debt covenant hypothesis because they are all based on small samples 
from surveys or interviews due to the lack of published covenant data. In contrast to the 
USA, UK-based firms are not obliged by company law to disclose such information in the 
UK. However, the UK provides an interesting laboratory for a test of the debt covenant 
hypothesis for two reasons.  On one hand, the large US-based banks have played a leading 
role in debt finance there since the late 1970s. In particular, they were instrumental in the 
development of the financial statement lending technology for medium term loans with their 
attendant accounting-based covenants. This has led to covenant convergence between the 
UK and USA. On the other hand, the UK and USA have contrasting bankruptcy codes. The 
UK’s debt-friendly bankruptcy code implies that firms have strong incentives to employ 
earnings management to avoid covenant violations. Britain’s insolvency law and its 
bankruptcy code means that adhering to debt covenants is more crucial for a firm’s survival 
than in the equity-friendly US national jurisdiction. A covenant violation in the UK 
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ultimately entitles the lending bank – and by extension all banks through cross-default 
clauses– to place that firm directly into receivership and liquidate its assets. By contrast, 
banks in the USA cannot place firms directly into liquidation if they file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection. The latter gives them 120 days to recapitalize and potentially find a 
solution to their financial difficulties. Thus, this thesis is motivated to implement a first test 
of the debt covenant hypothesis for the UK.   
Second, it examines whether corporate events such as SEOs affect the debt covenant 
hypothesis. This is motivated by the sharp increase in UK SEOs - particularly through 
private placements - which help strengthen their financial statement numbers and thus reduce 
the risk of breaching debt covenants. Firms which are in danger of breaching their covenants 
need additional funds since just managing earnings may not be sufficient to avoid covenant 
violations. SEOs are an obvious alternative source of funding that can help firms to improve 
their debt covenant financial ratios directly or indirectly. For instance, SEO firms can 
improve their interest coverage ratio (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization divided by interest expense) directly or indirectly by employing the funds to 
reduce long-term debt or to make investment, respectively. Armitage, Dionysiou, and 
Gonzalez (2014) note that the majority of distressed UK firms issue straight equity whereas 
comparable US firms do not. Existing studies, however, do not examine whether firms 
improve their financial situation and, in the process, to become less susceptible to debt 
covenant violations following SEOs. Hence, the continued use of earnings management to 
avoid covenant violations in the post-issue period remains an open question.  
Finally, this thesis examines revenue reclassification while existing studies have 
investigated expense misclassification (e.g. McVay 2006; Fan and Liu 2015). It analyses 
whether firms shift other revenues (e.g. one-time gain from the sale of assets) to core 
revenues. Several reasons motivate the examination of this research question. As the existing 
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literature (Ertimur, Livnat, and Martikainen 2003; Marguardt and Wiedman 2004) suggests 
that an increase in core revenues is more valued by investors than a decrease in core 
expenses, it is important to determine if management engages in this form of earnings 
management. The use of revenue reclassification reduces transitory gains which enables 
firms to manage investors’ perceptions. Kinney and Trezevant (1997) and Weiss (2001) 
document that firms are more likely to decrease non-recurring gains to influence investors’ 
perceptions by providing a signal that their earnings are mainly based on recurring 
operations. A further motivation is the finding in existing studies that core revenues are 
overestimated via real activities manipulation by offering price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010). It may be of interest to investors, auditors 
and regulators to understand whether firms manage core revenues via other specific 
channel(s). Lastly, since extant studies show that other expenses (e.g. income-decreasing 
special items) are used by firms for classification shifting, investors may be aware of the use 
of such items for overestimating core earnings. Therefore, managers may prefer to use other 
revenues to manage core earnings since the former have been largely ignored. 
1.3 Research design  
This thesis develops a three-pronged approach aimed at estimating a proxy for debt 
covenant slack which can be used in those countries where there is a lack of published 
covenant data. The first stage in this approach is to select a sample of firms that are likely to 
have covenant(s) and thus there is a possibility of the covenant thresholds being violated.  
The second stage is to choose the most commonly used covenants.  These are the ones that 
are more likely to feature in a sample of firms with covenants.  The third and most important 
stage is to estimate covenant slack proxies for the commonly used covenants as actual 
covenant values divided by judiciously chosen threshold values. The latter are carefully 
selected to match the covenant thresholds reported in the existing literature and then adjusted 
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to reflect changes across industries and years. These covenant slack proxies have the 
additional merit of being a consistent measure since there is emerging evidence that, in many 
cases, loan covenant thresholds are informally changed a number of times over the life of 
loans (Denis and Wang 2014; Roberts 2015). The implication is that the covenant threshold 
information reported at the origination of loans de facto becomes proxy information unless 
updated when changed. 
Real activities manipulation (hereafter RAM), accruals management (hereafter AM) and 
unexpected core revenues are used as earnings management measures. Three individual 
proxies: abnormal levels of production costs, abnormal levels of discretionary expenses and 
abnormal levels of cash flows from operations are investigated to determine firms’ RAM 
following Roychowdhury (2006). AM is estimated following Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh 
(2014). I construct the model which applies McVay’s (2006) expected core earnings model 
to measure unexpected core revenues. Regression models are developed to test for 1) the 
relationships between earnings management measures and debt covenant slack proxies; 2) 
the effects of SEOs on the debt covenant hypotheses; and 3) the association between 
unexpected core revenues and other revenues.  
1.4 Key findings 
The results for testing the debt covenant hypothesis for the UK indicate that firms close 
to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) covenants 
engage in higher levels of RAM rather than AM relative to firms far from violation. These 
findings strongly supports the debt covenant hypothesis and suggests a switch from AM to 
RAM, consistent with those of Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu (2015) and Kothari, Mizik, and 
Roychowdhury (2016) for the USA. I also find that mandatory IFRS adoption does not 
change the use of RAM for firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest 
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coverage covenants. However, it increases the propensity for employing RAM for firm close 
to default of their debt to EBITDA covenants.  
The findings for the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis show that the use of 
RAM to avoid the possibility of interest coverage covenant violations decreases from the 
pre-issue period to the post-issue period for SEO firms relative to the corresponding change 
for benchmark firms. This implies that firms improve their financial situation using SEO 
proceeds and, in the process, become less susceptible to debt covenant violations following 
SEOs. The results also show that the decrease in the use of RAM in the post SEO period to 
avoid the likelihood of breaching interest coverage covenant is more pervasive among SEO 
firms with low market to book ratios or high financial leverage. Furthermore, using accruals 
management and classification shifting measures of earnings management I find that firms 
do not engage in these manipulation methods to avoid the possibility of interest coverage 
covenant violations and this behaviour does not change following SEOs.  
The results for testing the revenue reclassification as an earnings management tool 
indicate that unexpected core revenues increase as other revenues decrease. This provides 
evidence that firms shift other revenues to core revenues, consistent with revenue 
reclassification. The results show that firms engage in such activities to a greater extent after 
mandatory IFRS adoption suggesting that the latter offers more latitude for these practices. 
This supports Zalata and Roberts (2015) who document that IFRS allows firms to have more 
managerial discretion on classification of non-recurring items.  
I also analyze whether firms with strong incentives use revenue reclassification to a 
greater extent. Existing studies document firms that make SEOs, are in financial distress, 
make acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and meet certain earnings 
benchmarks have high incentives to engage in earnings management. Marguardt and 
Wiedman (2004) find that firms that plan to make equity offerings inflate sales by employing 
9 
 
accruals management. A similar result is found by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) with regard to 
using real earnings management to overestimate sales in the year of the SEOs. Fan and Liu 
(2015) find that firms shift core expenses both from the cost of goods sold and selling, 
general and administrative expenses to income-decreasing special items for meeting/beating 
zero core earnings and prior period core earnings. As revenue reclassification is likely to 
inflate core revenues and core earnings, I expect that firms conducting SEOs, firms in 
financial distress, firms with acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and firms 
reporting small core earnings or small increases in core earnings employ revenue 
reclassification to a greater degree. My results are consistent with this expectation, 
suggesting that revenue reclassification is more pervasive among firms with strong 
incentives.  
1.5 Main contributions 
This thesis makes several contributions to the earnings management literature. First, it 
implements a first test of the debt covenant hypothesis for the UK. The debt covenant 
hypothesis is typically tested using small or large US samples (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
Dich1ev and Skinner 2002; Franz et al. 2014). It also tests whether IFRS affects the need for 
using earnings management to remain within debt covenant limits. This contributes to the 
literature that examines the effect of accounting standards on the use debt covenants 
(Demerjian 2011; Ball, Li, and Shivakumar 2015).  
Second, it investigates the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis which to the 
best of my knowledge has not been examined in the literature. The latter analyses how firms 
use the funds raised through equity offerings (Kim and Weisbach 2008; Walker and Yost 
2008). They document increases in investments such as R&D and capital expenditures 
following SEOs. This, however, does not suggest that firms improve their financial situation 
and, in the process, become less susceptible to debt covenant violations following SEOs.  
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Third, it extends the classification shifting literature by being the first to examine 
whether firms shift other revenues to core revenues. Existing studies have investigated 
whether firms reclassify core expenses (selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA) 
and/or cost of goods sold (COGS)) as income-decreasing special items (e.g. McVay 2006; 
Fan and Liu 2015) to increase core earnings. Forth, it investigates the effect of IFRS on the 
use of revenue shifting whereas existing studies have done similar examination for the other 
forms of earnings management. Finally, extant research has examined whether firms with 
strong incentives employ AM or RAM or expense reclassification to a greater extent. This 
thesis sheds new light on this issue by examining whether firms with strong incentives use 
revenue reclassification to a greater extent.  
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 implements a first test of the debt covenant 
hypothesis for the UK. It examines whether firms close to default or in violation use more 
RAM and/or AM than firms far from violation and whether IFRS adoption affects such 
practices. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis. 
Specifically, it tests whether firms change their RAM and/or AM practices to avoid interest 
coverage covenant violations following SEOs. Chapter 4 examines revenue reclassification 
as an earnings management tool. In particular, it tests whether firms shift other revenues to 
core revenues and whether this behavior changes after IFRS adoption. It also analyses 
whether firms with strong incentives use revenue reclassification to a greater extent. Chapter 









A First Test of the Debt Covenant Hypothesis for the UK 
                                   
                                   
                                                                  
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The Watts and Zimmerman (1986) debt-covenant hypothesis predicts that firms manage 
earnings to avoid covenant violations and existing studies provide some support for this. 
Earlier studies mainly use the debt-equity ratio as a proxy for covenant tightness or they 
study firms that enter technical default as a result of covenant violation(s) to examine the 
debt covenant hypothesis (e.g., Ayres 1986; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Sweeney 1994). 
The introduction of the Dealscan database in the late 1990s allowed researchers to use actual 
covenant slack to test the debt covenant hypothesis for large samples of mainly US firms 
including those that enter technical default (Dichev and Skinner 2002; Franz, HassabElnaby, 
and Lobo 2014). These studies tend to restrict their focus to US-based samples due to the 
large published covenant data where the latter is limited in other countries. However, there 
are a number of different institutional factors between the US and other countries, for 
example, IFRS rather than US GAAP and the law relating to corporate bankruptcy. These 
other factors might have the potential to influence corporate behavior and therefore there is a 
need for non US studies.  
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The first contribution of this paper is that it employs a relatively large sample of UK 
firms to undertake a first test of the debt covenant hypothesis. UK studies (Citron 1992; Moir 
and Sudarsanam 2007) do not directly test the debt covenant hypothesis but their evidence 
on covenants is consistent with US studies that find debt covenants are very common in loan 
contracts (Roberts and Sufi 2009; Demerjian 2011). UK studies do not test the debt covenant 
hypothesis because they are all based on small samples from surveys or interviews due to the 
lack of published covenant data. In contrast to the USA, UK-based firms are not obliged by 
company law to disclose such information.     
This paper focuses on the UK because it provides an interesting context for a test of the 
debt covenant hypothesis for two reasons.  On one hand, the large US-based commercial 
banks have played a leading role in debt finance there since the late 1970s. In particular, they 
were instrumental in the development of the financial statement lending technology for 
medium term loans with financial ratio accounting covenants. This has led to covenant 
convergence between the UK and USA.
1
 On the other hand, the UK and USA have 
contrasting bankruptcy codes. The UK’s debt-friendly bankruptcy code implies that firms 
have strong incentives to employ accruals management (hereafter AM) and/or real activities 
manipulation (hereafter RAM) to avoid covenant violations. Britain’s insolvency law and its 
bankruptcy code means that adhering to debt covenants is more crucial for a firm’s survival 
than in the equity-friendly US national jurisdiction.
2
 Generally, default events vest great 
power in the hands of banks in the UK since they imply that control rights over the borrower 
are transferred to them. A covenant violation in the UK ultimately entitles the lending bank – 
and by extension all banks through cross-default clauses
3
 – to place that firm directly into 
                                                          
1
  US commercial banks flooded into London from the late 1970s and early 1980s with the rise of the 
Eurodollar   market. London was used as the base for lending to both UK and European firms.  
2
   See Acharya, Sundaram, and John (2011) for more details of bankruptcy codes in the UK and USA. 
3
  Cross-default clauses are now standard in virtually all loan agreements as they prevent the bank with the 
defaulting covenant to get first bite of the firm’s assets to the detriment of other lenders. For instance, 95 
percent of the Li, Lou, and Vasvari (2015) sample of over 9000 US loan agreements had a cross-default clause.   
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receivership and liquidate its assets. By contrast, banks in the USA cannot place firms 
directly into liquidation if the firms file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The latter 
gives them 120 days to recapitalize and potentially find a solution to their financial 
difficulties.
4
 The fact that banks in the UK can directly liquidate firms’ assets following 
covenant violations provides further motivation for firms to manage earnings to avoid 
violations. Moreover, this may be good form of earnings management in the sense of 
Demerjian, Lewis-Western, and McVay (2015); both managers and shareholders share a 
common interest in minimizing the probability of covenant violations and of their firm going 
into liquidation. The implication is that I would expect to find stronger support for the debt 
covenant hypothesis in the UK.  
The paper’s second contribution is that it develops a three-pronged approach aimed at 
estimating a proxy for debt covenant slack which can be used in those countries where there 
is a lack of published covenant data.
5
 The first stage in this approach is to select a sample of 
firms that are likely to have covenant(s) and thus there is a possibility of the covenant 
thresholds being violated. The second stage is to choose the most commonly used covenants.  
These are the ones that are more likely to feature in a sample of firms with covenants.  The 
third and most important stage is to estimate covenant slack proxies for the commonly used 
covenants as actual covenant values divided by judiciously chosen threshold values. The 
latter are carefully selected to match the covenant thresholds reported in the existing 
literature and then adjusted to reflect changes across industries and years. These covenant 
slack proxies have the additional merit of being a consistent measure since there is emerging 
evidence that, in many cases, loan covenant thresholds are informally changed a number of 
                                                          
4
   See Li et al. (2015) for a recent discussion of default events in US loan and bond agreements. 
5
   Roychowdhury (2006) states that debt covenant data are not easily available even for a wide sample of US 
firms because Dealscan mainly covers the data for syndicated loans only. She, thus, uses a proxy, the existence 
of debt. Similarly, employing Dealscan, Franz et al. (2014) test the debt covenant hypothesis for the USA and 
concludes that the generalizability of their results may be limited as their sample is based on syndicated loans. 
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times over the life of loans.
6
 The implication is that the covenant threshold information 
reported at the origination of loans de facto becomes proxy information unless updated when 
changed. 
I use this three-pronged approach to overcome the lack of covenant data available for 
UK companies. In selecting a sample of firms that are likely to have covenant(s) and 
therefore there is a possibility of the covenant thresholds being violated, I use FTSE All 
Share Index UK listed firms with relatively small market capitalization, a minimum gearing 
ratio of 10 percent and no explicit covenant information. This is motivated by the fact that 
such firms tend to be subject to more and tighter covenants (Billett, King, and Mauer 2007; 
Franz et al. 2014). In my sample I employ interest coverage and debt to cash flow (debt to 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)) as the most 
commonly used covenants
7
 obtained from extant UK and US studies and the limited sample 
of Dealscan data for UK firms. Finally, to estimate covenant slack proxies for interest 
coverage and debt to EBITDA I determine their threshold values. To do this, I first identify 
the average threshold values found in the studies of Moir and Sudarsanam (2007) and 




I investigate UK firms’ use of AM and RAM to avoid debt covenant violations using 
2,087 observations covering 445 firms over the period 1999-2014. I partition the sample into 
three groups – firms that are in technical default, firms that are close to violating covenants, 
and firms that are far from violating covenants. The results indicate that firms close to 
                                                          
6
  See Denis and Wang (2014), Roberts (2015) and Li, Vasvara, and Moerman (2015) for details of such 
covenant changes in the USA.  
7
  Since we do not have actual covenant data, we focus on just two of the most commonly used covenants that 
on average a firm with debt are likely to have. For example, Rhodes (2016) reports in her US-based sample that 
the two most common covenants are debt to EBITDA and interest coverage and on average  her sample has 2.1 
covenants. However, if the covenant data was available we would have liked to employ the actual number of 
covenants in force in line with Demerjian and Owens (2014).  
8
  This is discussed in Section 3.1 and Appendix A.  
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violation or in technical default of their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) covenants 
engage in higher levels of RAM rather than AM relative to firms far from violation. These 
findings strongly support the debt covenant hypothesis and suggest a switch from AM to 
RAM, consistent with those of Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu (2015) and Kothari, Mizik, and 
Roychowdhury (2016) for the USA.  
The extant research has shown that traditional covenants are still frequently used 
although there is some evidence that their use decreases after IFRS adoption (Ball, Li, and 
Shivakumar 2015). Interestingly, both UK and US studies report the increasing use of the 
debt to EBITDA covenant (Moir and Sudarsanam 2007; Demerjian 2011). These findings 
suggest that the need for using earnings management to avoid breaching interest coverage 
and debt to EBITDA covenants does not change for the former but increases for the latter 
after IFRS adoption. Consistent with this, my results show that mandatory IFRS adoption 
does not change the use of RAM for firms close to violation or in technical default of their 
interest coverage covenants. However, it increases the propensity for employing RAM for 
firm close to default of their debt to EBITDA covenants.  
Finally, I find that my main findings are robust after controlling for endogeneity, 
financial distress, including a net worth covenant, and excluding the financial crisis period. 
However, the use of earnings management to remain within interest coverage or debt to 
EBITDA covenant limits is not significant in the UK Dealscan sample where firms disclose 
interest coverage or debt to EBITDA covenants. The latter result suggests that disclosing 
accounting information discourages earnings management, consistent with Jo and Kim 
(2007).  
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the main predictions and Section 3 
presents the research design. Section 4 describes the data, sample selection and summary 




Prior studies analyze which accounting and other debt-based covenants are used in bank 
debt contracts in the UK but do not formally test the debt covenant hypothesis due to the 
small sample sizes used. Citron (1992) investigates the types of accounting-based covenants 
using 25 UK bank loan contracts and 13 contract templates. He finds that interest coverage, 
net worth and gearing are the most frequently used accounting-based covenants. Day and 
Taylor (1996) interview 44 major UK corporate treasurers and provide findings that are 
consistent with Citron (1992). Chatterjee (2006) investigates performance pricing in debt 
contracts using a sample from 64 firms. He documents that debt to EBITDA and interest 
cover are the dominant debt covenants in UK debt contracting but that the debt to EBITDA 
ratio is the leading trigger in changing the terms of the debt contract. Moir and Sudarsanam 
(2007) in a survey of private debt contracts based on 72 large non-financial UK companies 
report that debt to EBITDA and interest cover are the most frequently occurring debt 
covenants along with gearing and net worth. Overall, the literature affirms that accounting-
based covenants are widely used in UK debt contracting and that the traditional interest 
coverage covenant has been supplemented by the debt to EBITDA covenant.    
The debt covenant hypothesis is mainly tested using small or large US samples. Early 
studies are based on small samples because of the hand-collected nature of the covenant 
data. Sweeney (1994) examines whether firms change accounting choices before the 
violations of debt covenants. She uses a sample of 130 firms which violate debt covenants 
for the first time during the sample period. She finds that firms are more likely to use 
income-increasing discretionary accounting changes when they are approaching violations of 
debt covenants. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) test the debt-covenant hypothesis by using 94 
firms which violate debt covenants during the sample period. They use both time-series and 
cross-sectional models to estimate abnormal accruals. Both their models show that abnormal 
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total and working capital accruals are significant and positive in the year prior to violation. 
In terms of the year of violation, they find positive working capital accruals only after 
controlling for management changes and auditor going concern qualifications.  
Recent US studies employ large samples and find that firms manage earnings to avoid 
covenant violations. Dichev and Skinner (2002) were the first to provide support for the 
debt-covenant hypothesis using a large sample of US firms. Similarly, employing a sample 
of 1,009 firms over the 1992-2007 period, Franz et al. (2014) find that US firms close to 
violation or in technical default of their current ratio covenants manage earnings more via 
RAM and AM than firms that are far from violating their current ratio covenants .
9
 They also 
find that, after the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the use of RAM increases while 
AM decreases. I expect that UK firms engage in AM and/or RAM because the incentives for 
avoiding debt covenant violations also exist in the UK. Furthermore, since the UK has a 
debt-friendly bankruptcy code I would suggest that there are greater incentives for UK firms 
to avoid infringing debt covenants. Therefore, I predict that UK firms close to violation or in 
technical default of their debt covenants have incentives to manage earnings. 
The above suggests the following prediction: 
P1A: Firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage covenants 
use more RAM and/or AM than firms far from violating their interest coverage 
covenants.  
P1B: Firms close to violation or in technical default of their debt to EBITDA covenants 
use more RAM and/or AM than firms far from violating their debt to EBITDA 
covenants.  
                                                          
9
  Kim, Lisic, and Pevzner (2011) find that US firms also employ RAM for avoiding net worth covenant 
violations. Furthermore, Demerjian (2009) finds that US firms manage depreciation and goodwill to avoid debt 
covenant violations.  
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The introduction of new accounting standards affects the use of accounting-based debt 
covenants. Ball et al. (2015) find that mandatory adoption of IFRS reduces both income-
based and balance sheet-based covenants as the latter provides less efficient thresholds for 
debt contracting. Demerjian (2011) documents that only the use of balance-sheet based debt 
covenants decreases after the introduction of new accounting standards in the USA. He 
shows that the frequency of income-based covenants remains stable while that of debt to 
EBITDA increases. This is consistent with Dichev and Skinner (2002) and Chava and 
Roberts (2008) who indicate that debt to EBITDA is the most commonly employed covenant 
in the USA. Similarly, Moir and Sudarsanam (2007) report the increasing use of such cash 
flow-based covenant in the UK. Taylor (2013) reviews the debt covenant literature and 
reaches the conclusion that, although traditional accounting covenants are still commonly 
used, the use of new cash flow-based covenants such as debt to EBITDA is increasing. The 
existing – albeit limited – UK evidence suggest that the interest coverage covenant is 
frequently employed both in the pre- and post-IFRS periods whereas debt to EBITDA is 
used mainly in the post-IFRS period. Thus, I expect that the incentives for using AM and/or 
RAM to avoid interest coverage covenant violations remain while those associated with 
potential breaches of debt to EBITDA thresholds might actually increase after IFRS 
adoption.
10
 This yields the following predictions: 
P2A: Firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage covenants 
do not alter the propensity for using RAM and/or AM after IFRS adoption. 
                                                          
10
  One could also argue that these practices are due to the tighter accounting standards following IFRS 
adoption. Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) find that IFRS reduces the use of AM. By contrast, existing 
studies show that the introduction of tighter and more rigid accounting standards increases RAM since it is not 
related to misleading disclosures and observable manipulations (e.g., Zang 2012). This implies that RAM can 
be used for avoiding both interest coverage and debt to EBITDA covenant violations to a greater extent after 
IFRS adoption. Thus, the effect of IFRS adoption on the use of accounting-based debt covenants is probably 
the main reason why firms change their earnings management practices in my analysis.  
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P2B: Firms close to violation or in technical default of their debt to EBITDA covenants 
increase the propensity for using RAM and/or AM after IFRS adoption. 
2.3 Research design 
2.3.1 Debt covenants 
Disclosure requirements for private bank debt are far less demanding in the UK than in 
the USA. UK-based firms are required only to disclose the class, amount, active date and 
maturity date of the debt whereas in the USA they are required to disclose fully detailed 
information about covenants and performance pricing (Chatterjee 2006). The Dealscan 
database provides covenant data only on 523 loans for 176 UK firms during my sample 
period.
 
The summary of covenant restrictions for these loans is shown in Table 2.1. Nearly 
98 percent of these loans contain at least one accounting-based debt covenant which is 
consistent with US studies (e.g. Roberts and Sufi 2009). Table 2.1 indicates that interest 
coverage and debt to EBITDA are the most frequently occurring covenants, in line with the 
relevant UK studies (Chatterjee 2006; Moir and Sudarsanam 2007). Similar results are 
reported by large sample-based studies which cover US firms (Roberts and Sufi 2009; 
Rhodes 2016). Since there is covenant convergence between the UK and USA (Taylor 2013) 
I conclude that interest coverage and debt to EBITDA are likely to be the most frequently 




                                                   [Insert Table 2.1 about here]  
                                                          
11
  We also use a net worth covenant in a robustness check.   
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Debt covenant slack proxies are carefully constructed for interest coverage and debt to 
EBITDA to investigate their association with earnings management measures. The covenant 
slack proxies are estimated in the spirit of Demerjian and Owens (2014) as follows: 
         𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡
                                                                                                                               (1) 
where Actuali,t is actual value of a particular debt covenant for firm i in year t; Thresholdi,t is 
the corresponding threshold value of that debt covenant. The actual values of the debt 
covenants are calculated using the standard covenant definitions specified by Demerjian and 
Owens (2014). Interest coverage is EBITDA divided by interest expense; debt to EBITDA is 
the sum of, long term debt and debt in current liabilities (short-term debt) divided by 
EBITDA. To determine threshold values for interest coverage, I first identify what is the 
average threshold value for the interest coverage covenant reported in the literature.
12
 I then 
adjust this average threshold value to obtain interest coverage threshold values for each 
industry-year group of companies. Industry effects are considered because they can impact 
debt contracts via their effects on firm-level fundamentals and probability of default related 
risk premiums (MacKay and Phillips 2005). I also consider year effects to control for 
economic factors. The same procedure is carried out to determine the threshold values for 
debt to EBITDA. Details of the calculation of the threshold values are provided in Appendix 
A.  
Debt covenants can have minimum or maximum threshold values. For example, interest 
coverage has minimum threshold values while debt to EBITDA has maximum threshold 
values. Based on (1) above, a debt covenant slack proxy of less than one implies violation 
for minimum threshold covenants and a proxy exceeding one indicates violation for 
maximum threshold covenants.     
                                                          
12
  Gamba and Triantis (2014) use a similar approach.  
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2.3.2 Accruals management 
I employ working capital discretionary accruals (A_WCA) to test for accruals 
management (AM). I use modified Jones (1991) model to estimate AM by taking into 
account firm growth and operating performance similar to Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh 
(2014). Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) indicate that extreme operating performance 
should be controlled for to avoid inaccurate estimation of abnormal accruals. Thus, 
following Collins et al. (2014), I run the following regression to estimate normal working 
capital accruals: 
   
 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1






+ ∑ 𝛽3,𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑂𝐴_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽4,𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝐺_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 to 𝑡+ ∑ 𝛽5,𝑘𝑘 𝑀𝑉_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 +
                            ∑ 𝛽6,𝑘𝑘 𝑀𝐵_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽7,𝑘𝑘 𝐸𝑃_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡                                                                                    (2) 
where WCAi,t is working capital accruals for firm i in year t, calculated as the change in total 
current assets minus the change in cash minus the change in current liabilities minus the 
change in the current portion of long term debt; ATi,t-1 is total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
∆CRi,t is the change in sales for firm i from year t-1 to year t minus the change in accounts 
receivable for firm i from year t-1 to year t; 𝑘 takes the values of 1, 2, 4, and 5; 
𝑅𝑂𝐴_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 is quintile dummies for the return on assets, defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations scaled by lagged total assets. 
𝑆𝐺_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 to 𝑡 is quintile dummies for the sales growth, defined as the change in sales 
from year t-1 to t divided by sales during year t-1. 𝑀𝑉_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 is quintile dummies for 
the market value of equity as of last year t-1; 𝑀𝐵_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 is quintile dummies for the 
market to book equity as of year t-1; 𝐸𝑃_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 is quintile dummies for earnings to 
price, calculated as net income for year t-1 divided by ending stock price as of year t-1; Each 
quintile dummy takes the value of 1 if the corresponding firm characteristic belongs to that 
𝑘’th quintile, and zero otherwise. Regression (2) is estimated cross-sectionally within 
22 
 
industry-years and normal working capital accruals are estimated using the estimated 
coefficients from regression (2). The difference between actual and normal working capital 
accruals gives working capital discretionary accruals (A_WCA).  
2.3.3 Real activities manipulation  
Roychowdhury (2006) defines RAM as departures from normal operating practices, 
motivated my managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain 
financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations. Certain RAM 
methods, such as reduction of R&D and price discounts, are possibly optimal actions in 
certain economic circumstances. If managers, however, engage in these activities more 
extensively than is normal given their economic circumstances they are engaging in RAM. 
Roychowdhury (2006) develops models to derive normal levels of operating activities to 
detect RAM. I employ three individual proxies: abnormal levels of production costs 
(A_PROD), abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (A_DISX) and abnormal levels of cash 
flows from operations (A_CFO) to determine firms’ RAM following Roychowdhury (2006).  








































+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡                                                                                            (5) 
where PRODi,t is production costs for firm i in year t, defined as cost of sales plus change in 
inventory; Si,t is sales for firm i in year t; DISXi,t is discretionary expenses for firm i in year t, 
defined as SG&A (selling, general and administrative) expenses plus R&D expenses; CFOi,t 
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is cash flows from operations for firm i in year t. Regressions (3), (4) and (5) are estimated 
cross-sectionally for each industry-year.  
Given sales levels, firms with abnormally high production costs, abnormally low 
discretionary expenses, or with abnormally low cash flows from operations are regarded as 
engaging in RAM. Similar to existing studies, I multiply abnormal discretionary expenses 
and abnormal cash flows from operations by minus one for ease of interpretation of the 
RAM proxies. I also calculate an aggregated measure of RAM (A_RAM) by combining the 
three individual proxies to measure the total effect of RAM (Franz et al. 2014).
13
 Therefore, 
a positive value of any RAM proxy or its aggregated measure is considered as real earnings 
manipulation. 
2.3.4 Regression model 
The following OLS regression model is run to test whether firms close to violation or in 
technical default of their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) covenants use more RAM 




   𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = α0 + α1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + α2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑈𝐿𝑇_𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + α3𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + α4𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑈𝐿𝑇_𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 +
        α5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + α6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + α7𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + α8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + α9𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + α10𝐴_𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡  (𝑜𝑟 𝐴_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
                                                                                                                                                (6) 
where EMi,t is earnings management proxy for firm i in year t that refers to one of the five 
earnings management measures: abnormal production costs (A_PRODi,t), abnormal 
discretionary expenses (A_DISXi,t), abnormal cash flows from operations (A_CFOi,t), 
aggregated measure of RAM (A_RAMi,t), and working capital discretionary accruals 
                                                          
13
 I also use two different aggregate measures of RAM by summing 1) the abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses and 2) the abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal cash flows from 
operations following Chan et al. (2015). I find similar results shown in Table 2.14.  
14
  My results are very similar if I add industry fixed effects to my regression model (see Table 2.15).  
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(A_WCAi,t); CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away 
from the interest coverage covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise.   
DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on interest 
coverage and zero otherwise. CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 
0% and 15% away from the debt to EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero 
otherwise. DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on 
debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise. The variables A_DISXi,t and A_CFOi,t are multiplied by 
-1 to simplify the interpretation of my earnings management proxies, and I expect 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 
𝛼3, and 𝛼4 to be positive in model (6).  
I add MTBi,t , LEVi,t , MVi,t-1, 𝑅𝑂𝐴i,t , NOAi,t-1 and A_RAMi,t (A_WCAi,t) as control 
variables to my linear regression model (2) following the earnings management literature. 
MTBi,t is the market to book ratio for firm i in year t, defined as the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity. This variable is included to control for growth 
opportunities. LEVi,t is leverage ratio, defined as the sum of long term debt and debt in 
current liabilities divided by lagged total assets. This is included as a control for capital 
structure. MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity and is added to control 
for firm size. 𝑅𝑂𝐴i,t is income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets  and is 
included to control for firm performance. NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets, defined as common 
equity minus cash and short-term investment plus total debt divided by lagged total assets. 
The latter is added to control for the use of earnings management proxies. I include A_RAMi,t 
(A_WCAi,t) to control for substitution mechanisms in earnings management proxies.  
I extend model (6) by adding a dummy variable, IFRS, that is equal to 1 for 
observations after 2005 and 0 otherwise, and its interactions with CLOSE_ICi,t-1, 
DEFAULT_ICi,t-1, CLOSE_DTEi,t-1, and DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1. The estimated value of these 
coefficients is used to examine whether firms close to violation or in technical default of 
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their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) covenants alter the propensity for using RAM 
and/or AM after IFRS adoption (P2A and P2B). Accordingly, the regression is: 
   𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = α0 + α1𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + α2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑈𝐿𝑇_𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + α3𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + α4𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑈𝐿𝑇_𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ α5𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + α6𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + α7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑈𝐿𝑇_𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
+ α8𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + α9𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑈𝐿𝑇_𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + α10𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ α11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + α12𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + α13𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + α14𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + α15𝐴_𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡  (𝑜𝑟 𝐴_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                             (7) 
I expect 𝛼6and 𝛼7 not to be significant while 𝛼8and 𝛼9 to be significantly positive in model 
(7).                                                                                                                                                                       
I determine whether there is cross sectional or time series dependence to avoid biased 
standard errors in my panel model following the Petersen (2009) methodology. This 
indicates that there is cross sectional dependence since the White standard errors are not the 
same as the standard errors clustered by year whereas they are the same as the standard 
errors clustered by firms. Accordingly, standard errors clustered by year are used to mitigate 
this problem.  
2.4. Data, sample selection, and summary statistics 
2.4.1 Data and sample selection  
Accounting and financial data are collected from Compustat Global for UK listed firms 
that belong to the FTSE All Share Index for the period between 1998 and 2014.
15
 Following 
existing studies, I exclude financial and utility firms because of their different financial 
reporting environment and highly predictable earnings, respectively. The estimation of the 
                                                          
15




production costs proxy of RAM requires two years of lagged data under the same accounting 
standards. As a result, I lose the data for 1998 and I also exclude 2005 since it is a 
transitional period for IFRS.    
Researchers have found that firms with high gearing (Billett et al. 2007) and smaller size 
(Bradley and Roberts, 2004) have more and tighter debt covenants. Demerjian (2010) 
documents that the number of covenants decreases with firm size and increases with 
leverage level. Similarly, Day and Taylor (1995) found that borrower financial status, high 
gearing and firm size are the main determinants of the number and tightness of covenants in 
UK debt contracting.
16
 Since there is a lack of explicit covenant data in the UK, I tailor my 
sample to include those firms that are likely to be constrained by more and tighter debt 
covenants. In other words, I select a sample of firms that has a higher propensity to violate 
covenant thresholds in contrast with Dealscan samples. The latter cover those UK firms that 
disclose covenant information, suggesting that they are far from violating covenants.  
Therefore, I exclude from my sample: 1) large firms that are in the highest quintile by lagged 
market value 2) low gearing firms that have a gearing ratio of less 10 percent
17,18




I require at least 6 observations per industry-year to ensure that I have sufficient data for 
the estimation of earnings management measures. The Global Industry Classification 
Scheme (GICS) industry classification is applied because it gives more accurate empirical 
results (Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler 2003). All variables are winsorised at the 1 percent and 99 
                                                          
16
  Moir and Sudarsanam (2007) also provide evidence that accounting-based debt covenants are less frequently 
used in debt contracts for large UK firms. 
17
  After excluding firms with a lower than 10 percent gearing ratio, the mean and median of the latter becomes 
around 30 percent for the final sample which is consistent with previous studies examining debt covenants 
(e.g., Ball et al. 2015). I also analyze a further sample of firms with a higher than 15 percent gearing ratio and 
find qualitatively similar results.                
18
  When we exclude firms with low gearing, I also lose most of the observations with high Z scores (Taffler 
(1983) Z score). This indicates that firms in my sample do not have negligible default risk and so they are more 
susceptible to violating debt covenant thresholds (Demiroglu and James 2010).  
19
  As a result, I lose 70 large firms, 154 low gearing firms and 34 Dealscan firms. The main results remain 
qualitatively the same if I do not exclude Dealscan firms. 
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percent levels to eliminate the impact of outliers.
20
 Consequently, the final sample consists 
of 444 firms and 2,083 observations.  
2.4.2 Summary statistics 
Table 2.2, Panel A and B show the descriptive statistics of the main variables for the 
three subsamples (firms close to violation (close), firms in technical default (default), and 
firms far from violation (far)) based on interest coverage and debt to EBITDA covenants, 
respectively.  
                                                        [Table 2.2 around here]  
Firms in the default subsample are significantly smaller, more leveraged and have lower 
market to book ratio and returns on assets than firms in the far subsample as shown by the 
descriptive statistics for the firm characteristic variables in Panel A. I also find similar results 
for firms in the close subsample relative to firms in the far subsample. Therefore, not 
surprisingly, the median and mean values of RAM measures (aggregated measure of real 
activities manipulation (A_RAM), abnormal production costs (A_PROD), abnormal 
discretionary expenses (A_DISX) and abnormal cash flows from operations (A_CFO)) are 
higher for firms in the close and default subsamples compared to firms in the far subsample. 
These imply that firms close to violation or in technical default use more RAM than firms far 
form violation. However, the medians and means of working capital discretionary accruals 
(A_WCA) is 0 for all subsamples, suggesting that the use of AM is limited. Panel A further 
shows that close and default subsamples have more or less the same firm characteristics. The 
main significant difference between these subsamples is that firms in the close subsample 
use more RAM and have higher returns on assets. I also find nearly similar differences 
                                                          
20
  This is more efficient in dealing with outliers than winsorising by year at the same percentage levels since 
the former gives lower levels of skewness, kurtosis and standard deviation. 
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among close, default, and far subsamples based on debt to EBITDA covenant. Overall, the 
results suggest that firms close to violation or in technical default have poorer financial 
health than firms far from violation, in line with Franz et al. (2014).
21
                      
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 The debt covenant hypothesis 
Table 2.3, columns (1) to (4) present the RAM regression results for testing the debt 
covenant hypothesis and AM regression results are in column (5).  
                                                  [Table 2.3 around here]                                        
Column (1) indicates statistically significantly positive associations between aggregate 
RAM (A_RAM) and CLOSE_IC and DEFAULT_IC at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, 
respectively. The coefficients are also economically significant. This implies that firms close 
to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage covenants use more RAM than 
firms far from violation of their interest coverage covenants. I also find similar results for the 
debt to EBITDA covenant as the coefficients on CLOSE_DTE and DEFAULT_DTE are 
significantly positive in column (1). Turning to the individual RAM measures, column (2) 
shows a significant relationship between abnormal production costs (A_PROD) and the 
dummy variable CLOSE_IC. This suggests that firms close to violation of their interest 
coverage covenants increase abnormal production more relative to firms far from violation 
of their interest coverage covenants. Furthermore, I find that firms close to default or in 
violation reduce discretionary expenses and lower abnormal cash flows more compared to 
firms far from violation as indicated by the significant coefficients on CLOSE_IC, 
CLOSE_DTE and DEFAULT_DTE in columns (3) and (4). These results are consistent with 
                                                          
21
  I also check whether my covenant measure can capture imputed slack without too much noise by comparing 
my covenant slack proxy for dead firms with the one for live firms.  I find that dead firms in my sample have 
tighter covenant slack than live firms as they have significantly smaller covenant medians (means).  
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the debt covenant hypothesis (Dichev and Skinner 2002; Franz et al. 2014) and indicate that 
firms close to violation or in technical default engage in RAM to avoid covenant violations.  
Column (5) shows a significant relationship between working capital discretionary 
accruals (A_WCA) and DEFAULT_DTE. This indicates that firms in technical default of 
their debt to EBITDA covenants employ more AM than firms far from violation of their debt 
to EBITDA covenants.
 
I, however, do not find such evidence for firms close to violation of 
their debt to EBITDA covenants or for firms in violation or close to default of their interest 
coverage covenants. This is probably due to the costly nature of AM under UK GAAP 
(Peasnell, Pope, and Young 2000; Osma and Young 2009) and after IFRS adoption (Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Barth et al. 2008). My results are consistent with the findings 
that the introduction of tighter and more rigid accounting standards makes RAM an 
appealing proxy for earnings management (Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012).    
Overall, the findings suggest that UK firms close to violation or in technical default of 
their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) covenants employ RAM and AM more but mainly 
the former than firms far from violation of their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) 
covenants.
22
 Hence, P1A and P1B are supported. 
2.5.2 IFRS adoption and the debt covenant hypothesis 
Table 2.4, column (1) presents the RAM regression results for testing the effect of IFRS 
adoption on the debt covenant hypothesis while the AM regression results are in column (2).  
                                                [Table 2.4 around here]                                       
                                                          
22
 I also analyze the total use of earnings management for avoiding covenant violations by summing the 
working capital discretionary accruals and the aggregated measure of RAM. The results show that firms close 




Column (1) shows that CLOSE_IC and DEFAULT_IC are significant at the 1 percent 
levels, showing that firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage 
covenants use more RAM than firms far from violation of their interest coverage covenants 
in the pre-IFRS period. Similar results are found for the debt to EBITDA covenant in the 
pre-IFRS period. As can be seen in column (1), the coefficients on IFRS*CLOSE_DTE and 
IFRS*DEFAULT_DTE are positive though only the coefficient on the former is significant. 
The implication is that the use of RAM particularly for firms close to default of their debt to 
EBITDA covenants increases following IFRS adoption. This confirms the enhanced 
importance of this cash flow-based debt covenant in the UK, consistent with Chatterjee 
(2006) and Moir and Sudarsanam (2007). Column (1) further shows that the coefficients on 
IFRS*CLOSE_IC and IFRS*DEFAULT_IC are negative and insignificant. This implies that 
IFRS adoption does not alter the use of RAM for firms close to default or in violation of 
their interest coverage covenants. This is possibly due to the more or less stable use of the 
interest coverage covenant in UK debt contracting both in the pre- and post-IFRS periods. 
Finally, the results in column (2) indicate no significant association between A_WCA and the 
interaction variables. This indicates that IFRS adoption does not change the use of AM for 
firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) 
covenants. 
To summarize, my results indicate some evidence that mandatory IFRS adoption 
increases the use of RAM for firms close to default of their debt to EBITDA covenants while 
it leaves unchanged the use of these activities for firms close to violation or in technical 
default of their interest coverage covenants.
23
 Thus, P2A and P2B are supported.  
   
                                                          
23
  I also find that mandatory IFRS adoption increases the use of total earnings management for firms close to 
default or in violation of their debt to EBITDA covenants while it leaves unchanged the use of these activities 
for firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage covenants (see Table 2.17). 
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2.6 Sensitivity tests  
2.6.1 Alternative research design  
In the main analysis, I use indicator variables for the interest coverage and debt to 
EBITDA covenants to test the debt covenant hypothesis. I further check whether the main 
results are robust using an alternative research design. To do so, I regress RAM and AM on 
the interest coverage covenant slack proxy (IC_PROXY) and the debt to EBITDA covenant 
slack proxy (DTE_PROXY) along with the control variables used in the main analysis. The 
results are presented in Table 2.5. 
                                              [Table 2.5 around here]          
 Column (1) indicates statistically significantly negative and positive associations at the 
1% level between aggregate RAM (A_RAM) and the IC_PROXY and DTE_PROXY. This 
implies that firms use RAM to avoid interest coverage and debt to EBITDA covenant 
violations. I also find that firms employ AM only to avoid interest coverage covenant 
violations. Overall, the results show that the main findings are robust to an alternative 
research design.  
2.6.2 Financial distress 
Firms that are in financial distress have strong incentives to engage in earnings 
management (Butler, Leone, and Willenborg 2004). In my sample, 557 observations out of 
2,087 have a negative Z score (Taffler model), indicating that they are close to financial 
distress. However, on average, the firms in my sample have a positive Z score as the mean 
lagged Z score is 2.72. In order to ensure that the main results are due to managing earnings 
to avoid covenant violations and not to firms suffering financial distress, I add a control 
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variable, lagged Z score to the main regression and re-estimate it. Table 2.6 shows that the 
findings are similar to the main results.     
                                                  [Table 2.6 around here]                               
2.6.3 Debt covenants including net worth 
I used the most popular traditional covenant (interest coverage) and one new widely 
used cash flow-based covenant (debt to EBITDA) in the main analysis. Demiroglu and 
James (2010) report that the average loan in their sample has three accounting-based 
covenants. Thus, a net worth based covenant is added to the main regression to check that 
my results are not driven by excluded accounting covenants. Extant studies and the limited 
covenant information on UK firms available in Dealscan show that this covenant is one of 
the frequently used traditional covenants. The 37
th
 percentile of the net worth covenant is 
specified as the threshold value for this covenant following Nini et al. (2012) who report that 
the median net worth of the violators puts them at the 37
th 
percentile of the overall sample. 
Table 2.7 indicates that the inclusion of the net worth covenant does not alter the main 
conclusion of the main findings. 
                                                [Table 2.7 around here]                                       
2.6.4 Financial crisis period 
Existing studies provide inconclusive results on the use of earnings management during 
the financial crisis period (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2007). Moreover, debt contract designs 
during this time might have different features (Demerjian 2011). As my sample spans the 
recent financial crisis period (2008-2010), the primary results might not be based on a 
homogenous sample. Thus, I exclude the crisis period from the sample and re-run the main 
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analysis. Table 2.8 shows that firms close to violation or in technical default manage 
earnings more than firms far from violation, consistent with the primary findings.   
                                                   [Table 2.8 around here]                                       
2.6.5 Dealscan sample 
My main analysis overcomes the lack of published UK covenant data by selecting a 
sample of firms that have a high propensity to violate covenant thresholds to test the debt 
covenant hypothesis. I now report the results from testing this hypothesis using the UK 
Dealscan sample of large firms.
24
 An increase in accounting disclosures improves 
transparency and decreases the use of earnings management (Jo and Kim 2007). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that firms disclosing covenant information are less likely to manage earnings to 
avoid covenant violations. This additional analysis uses the Dealscan interest coverage or 
debt to EBITDA covenant data. After matching these loans to financial data, the interest 
coverage sample contains 44 firms and 150 loan-years while the debt to EBITDA sample has 
18 firms and 67 loan-years.
25
 I regress RAM and AM on the interest coverage (debt to 
EBITDA) covenant slack along with the control variables used in the main analysis. The 
results are presented in Table 2.9 
                                                 [Table 2.9 around here]        
The table shows that firms disclosing their interest coverage covenant or debt to 
EBITDA covenant do not employ RAM or AM to avoid covenant violations. This is perhaps 
because disclosing accounting information discourages earnings management or large and 
financially sound firms have a low propensity to violate their covenant thresholds. 
                                                          
24
  For instance, the mean market capitalisation of £393.8m for my main sample is dwarfed by that of 
£5,518.7m for the Dealscan sample with interest coverage data.  
25
   I lose a large number of these loans due to the lack of either financial data or threshold values.  
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2.6.6 Checking the sensitivity of debt covenant slack proxies 
In the main analysis, the 20
th
 percentile of interest coverage and the 80
th
 percentile of 
debt to EBITDA are used to estimate interest coverage and debt to EBITDA covenant slack 
proxies. In order to check sensitivity of the main results, I first employ the 15
th
 percentile of 
the interest coverage and the 85
th
 percentile of the debt to EBITDA and then the 25
th
 
percentile of the interest coverage and the 75
th
 percentile of the debt to EBITDA to estimate 
covenant slack proxies and re-run the main regressions. The results are presented in Table 
2.10 and 2.11, respectively. Overall, they indicate that these sensitivity tests yield 
qualitatively similar findings.  
                                             [Table 2.10 around here]  
                                             [Table 2.11 around here]      
2.6.7 Alternative measure for accruals management  
Collins et al. (2014) recommend adding multiple factor quintile dummies to (modified) 
Jones (1991) model to measure AM. In the main analysis, I use quintile dummies for 
performance, growth, size, market to book, and earnings to price firm characteristics. I 
further check the robustness of my main results by adding only performance and growth firm 
characteristics to modified Jones (1991) model. The results are shown in Table 2.12. Overall, 
they indicate that this sensitivity test yields qualitatively similar findings.  
                                                 [Table 2.12 around here]  
2.6.8 Alternative measures for real activities manipulation  
Fan and Liu (2015) find that firms can also manage selling, general and administrative 
and production expenses by shifting them to income-decreasing special items. This suggests 
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the importance of controlling for expense misclassification when firms’ RAM are examined. 
To do so, I include income-decreasing special items in Roychowdhury’s (2006) abnormal 
production costs (A_PROD) and discretionary expenses (A_DISX) models and re-estimate 
the main regressions. The results are similar to the main findings as shown in Table 2.13. 
                                             [Table 2.13 around here] 
2.7 Conclusions  
This study is the first to test the debt covenant hypothesis for a relatively large sample of 
UK FTSE All Share Index firms over the period 1999-2014. It investigates whether firms 
close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) 
covenants engage in higher levels of accruals management and/or real activities 
manipulation relative to firms far from violation and whether IFRS adoption affects such 
practices. The findings indicate that firms close to violation or in technical default of interest 
coverage (debt to EBITDA) covenants use more real activities manipulation than firms far 
from violation. They show that mandatory IFRS adoption does not change the use of RAM 
for firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage covenants. 
However, it increases the propensity for employing real activities manipulation for firm 
close to default of their debt to EBITDA covenants. The main results hold after controlling 
for the potential endogeneity of debt covenants. To sum up, the findings support the debt 
covenant hypothesis for the interest coverage covenant over the full sample and for debt to 








For the firms in my sample I calculate their actual year-end values for the two ratios 
interest coverage and debt to EBITDA. This gives us a sample of 2,083 observations for 
each ratio.  I then list the ratios in rank order from lowest to highest obtaining a 2,083 X 1 
column matrix. The next step is to identify what is the most likely covenant value for each of 
the two ratios. This is obtained by looking at the values reported in previous debt covenant 
survey papers in the UK. For example, Moir and Sudarsanam (2007) report that the interest 
coverage covenant generally has a threshold value of around 3 (between 2.5 and 4) and that 
of the debt to EBITDA covenant ranges between 2.5 and 4.5. These are consistent with the 
relevant Dealscan samples for UK firms and the large sample-based US study Rhodes 
(2016). I then identify the value in my matrix for interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) which 




) percentile. Table 2.18 shows the percentiles of the interest coverage and debt to 
EBITDA ratios in my sample. 
I then list the actual interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) ratios for each firm by industry 




) percentile interest coverage 
(debt to EBITDA) figure.  So for a particular industry/year group that might be an interest 
coverage (debt to EBITDA) ratio of say 2.5. This becomes my interest coverage (debt to 
EBITDA) threshold value for that industry/year group.  After this I divide the actual interest 
coverage (debt to EBITDA) values for each firm in that industry/year group by the interest 
coverage (debt to EBITDA) threshold value (in my example the 2.5) and the resultant values 
I term my slack for interest coverage (debt to EBITDA). For example, if a firm has an actual 
interest coverage ratio in that industry/year group of say 10 then the slack will be 




                                                                              
 
                                                        Table 2.1 
                                                               Summary of covenant restrictions 
  Covenant          Number of loans    Number of firms 
  Interest Coverage 287 98 
  Debt to EBITDA 141 47 
  (Tangible) Net Worth 69 36 
  Leverage Ratio                                   37 13 
  Fixed Charge Coverage 33 10 
  Senior Debt to EBITDA 
  Debt Service Coverage   
  Debt to Equity   
  EBITDA 
  Loan to Value    
  Cash Interest Coverage 



































                                                                 Table 2.2 
                                                             Summary statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics based on interest coverage covenants 
 A_RAMi,t A_PRODi,t A_CFOi,t A_DISXi,t A_WCAi,t MTBi,t  LEVi,t MVi,t-1 ROAi,t NOAi,t-1 
  Default subsample (1) (n=418) 
        
  Mean  0.077 0.039 0.028 0.010 0.000 1.848 0.359 5.013 -0.056 0.649 
  Median  0.085 0.045 0.031 0.018 0.000 1.234 0.316 5.063 -0.011 0.611 
  Close subsample (2) (n=215) 
        
  Mean  0.125 0.089 0.018 0.018 0.000 1.794 0.335 5.188 0.004 0.619 
  Median   0.117 0.052 0.017 0.031 0.000 1.272 0.294 5.164 0.028 0.605 
  diff. in mean           
     (1)-(2) 
* ** * 
     
*** 
 
  diff. in median           
     (1)-(2) *  
*** 
     
*** 
 
  Far subsample (3) (n=1,450)         
  Mean -0.039 -0.023 -0.011 -0.005 0.000 2.516 0.280 5.432 0.049 0.644 
  Median  -0.010 0.000 -0.006 0.009 0.000 1.819 0.252 5.478 0.051   0.625 
  diff. in mean      
 
       
    (1)-(3) 
*** *** *** * 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
  diff. in median           
    (1)-(3) 
*** *** *** 
  
*** *** *** *** 
 
  diff. in mean            
    (2)-(3) 
*** *** *** ** 
 
** *** *** *** 
 
  diff. in median           
    (2)-(3) 
*** *** *** ** 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
Notes  
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_PRODi,t is abnormal production costs, 
A_DISXi,t is abnormal discretionary expenses, A_CFOi,t is abnormal cash flows from operations A_WCAi,t is 
working capital discretionary accruals, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
 ***/**/* 










Panel B: Descriptive statistics based on debt to EBITDA covenants 
 A_RAMi,t A_PRODi,t A_CFOi,t A_DISXi,t A_WCAi,t MTBi,t LEVi,t MVi,t-1 ROAi,t NOAi,t-1 
  Default subsample (1) (n=469) 
        
  Mean  0.095 0.046 0.036 0.012 0.000 1.649 0.380 4.910 -0.071 0.663 
  Median  0.105 0.056 0.033 0.019 0.000 1.205 0.336 4.951 -0.014 0.629 
  Close subsample (2) (n=278) 
        
  Mean  0.022 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.000 1.863 0.382 5.417   0.023 0.679 
  Median   0.053 0.023 0.010 0.019 0.000 1.273 0.333 5.437    0.031 0.636 
  diff. in mean           
     (1)-(2) 
*** ** *** 
    
*** *** 
 
  diff. in median           





  Far subsample (3) (n=1,336)         
  Mean -0.036 -0.017 -0.014 -0.005 0.000 2.631 0.258 5.448 0.056 0.627 
  Median  -0.014 -0.002 -0.008 0.009 0.000 1.869   0.233 5.507 0.054   0.617 
  diff. in mean      
 
       
    (1)-(3) 
*** *** *** ** 
 
*** *** *** *** * 
  diff. in median           
    (1)-(3) 
*** *** *** * 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
  diff. in mean            
    (2)-(3) 
***  ***  
 
*** ***  *** ** 
  diff. in median           
    (2)-(3) 
*** ** *** * 
 
*** ***  *** ** 
Notes  
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_PRODi,t is abnormal production costs, 
A_DISXi,t is abnormal discretionary expenses, A_CFOi,t is abnormal cash flows from operations A_WCAi,t is 
working capital discretionary accruals, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
***/**/* 









                                                       Table 2.3 
                                                                The debt covenant hypothesis 
          (1)          (2)         (3)         (4)          (5) 
Variable    A_RAM i,t   A_PROD i,t   A_DISX i,t    A_CFO i,t     A_WCA i,t 
      
CLOSE_ICi,t-1 0.0951*** 0.0731*** 0.0099 0.0122** -0.0020 
 (3.574) (3.153) (0.740) (2.448) (-0.964) 
DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 0.0515** 0.0294 0.0170 0.0051 -0.0014 






 (1.564) (0.377) (1.820) (1.759) (0.197) 
DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 0.0625*** 0.0227 0.0144 0.0254*** 0.0031* 
 (3.162) (1.301) (1.026) (4.510) (2.146) 
MTBi,t -0.0007 0.0019* -0.0022** -0.0004 0.0001 
 (-0.480) (2.137) (-2.831) (-1.357) (1.133) 
LEVi,t -0.1280*** -0.0744** -0.0140 -0.0396*** -0.0028 
 (-4.127) (-2.865) (-0.754) (-7.396) (-1.595) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0181*** -0.0111** -0.0062*** -0.0007 -0.0002 
 (-3.241) (-2.785) (-3.205) (-0.755) (-0.532) 
ROAi,t -0.0785 -0.0329 0.1188*** -0.1644*** 0.0086* 
 (-1.073) (-0.929) (3.429) (-8.730) (1.849) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0037 -0.0120 0.0136 -0.0053** -0.0019 
 (-0.268) (-1.706) (1.706) (-2.654) (-1.395) 
A_WCAi,t -0.2072 -0.3148 0.0361 0.0714*  
 (-1.303) (-1.291) (0.320) (2.125)  
A_RAMi,t     -0.0014 
     (-1.351) 
Constant 0.1053** 0.0680** 0.0224 0.0149* 0.0025 
 (2.430) (2.435) (1.443) (2.009) (1.553) 
      
Observations 2,083 2,083 2,083 2,083 2,083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.032 0.013 0.011 0.167 -0.001 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. A_RAMi,t is aggregated 
measure of real activities manipulation, A_PRODi,t is abnormal production costs, A_DISXi,t is 
abnormal discretionary expenses, A_CFOi,t is abnormal cash flows from operations, A_WCAi,t is 
working capital discretionary accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 
0% and 15% away from the interest coverage covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, 
DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on interest coverage and 
zero otherwise, CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away 
from the debt to EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is 
equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, 
MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
***/**/* 
indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed). 
 




                                                       Table 2.4 
           The debt covenant hypothesis before and after mandatory IFRS adoption   
 (1) (2) 
Variables  A_RAMi,t A_WCAi,t 
   
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.1303*** -0.0059* 
 (3.264) (-2.127) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.0729*** -0.0010 
 (3.149) (-1.337) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0019 0.0011 
 (0.080) (0.500) 
DEFAULT_DTE i,t-1 0.0473* 0.0040* 
 (1.953) (1.983) 
IFRSi,t 0.0132 -0.0005 
 (1.004) (-1.227) 
IFRSi,t* CLOSE_IC i,t-1 -0.0787 0.0077 
 (-1.686) (2.164) 
IFRSi,t* DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 -0.0550 -0.0009 
 (-1.761) (-0.611) 
IFRSi,t* CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0664* -0.0018 
 (1.978) (-0.581) 
IFRSi,t* DEFAULT_DTE i,t-1 0.0365 -0.0019 
 (1.382) (-0.960) 
MTBi,t -0.0006 0.0001 
 (-0.408) (1.040) 
LEVi,t -0.1253*** -0.0029 
 (-4.053) (-1.696) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0191*** -0.0001 
 (-3.132) (-0.368) 
ROAi,t -0.0818 0.0095* 
 (-1.103) (2.116) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0008 -0.0021 
 (-0.059) (-1.474) 
A_WCAi,t -0.1933  
 (-1.237)  
A_RAMi,t  -0.0013 
  (-1.282) 
Constant 0.1024* 0.0026 
 (2.139) (1.608) 
   
Observations 2,083 2,083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.032 -0.002 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. A_RAMi,t 
is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_WCAi,t is working capital 
discretionary accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% 
and 15% away from the interest coverage covenant violation threshold and zero 
otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default 
on interest coverage and zero otherwise, CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years 
that are between 0% and 15% away from the debt to EBITDA covenant violation 
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threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are 
in technical default on debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, IFRSi,t is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 for observations after 2005 and 0 otherwise, MTBi,t is the market-to-
book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity, ROAi,t  is return on asset and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
***/**/* 































                                                                     Table 2.5 
                                    The debt covenant hypothesis an alternative research design 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable  A_RAMi,t A_WCAi,t 
   
IC_PROXYi,t-1 -0.0111*** -0.0002*** 
 (-6.702) (-6.209) 
DTE_PROXYi,t-1 0.0256*** -0.0025*** 
 (3.651) (-3.874) 
MTBi,t -0.0003 0.0000 
 (-0.212) (0.760) 
LEVi,t -0.1515*** 0.0001 
 (-4.222) (0.033) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0221*** -0.0002 
 (-3.877) (-0.658) 
ROAi,t -0.1186* 0.0084* 
 (-1.854) (2.171) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0151 -0.0016 
 (-1.008) (-1.068) 
A_WCAi,t -0.1599  
 (-1.055)  
A_RAMi,t  -0.0011 
  (-1.074) 
Constant 0.1899*** 0.0040* 
 (4.153) (2.030) 
   
Observations 2,083 2,083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 0.004 
Notes 
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_WCAi,t is 
working capital discretionary accruals, IC_PROXYi,t-1 is the interest coverage 
covenant slack proxy, DTE_PROXYi,t-1 is the debt to EBITDA covenant slack 
proxy, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t  is return on asset, and 
NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
***/**/* 














                                                      Table 2.6 
                                   The debt covenant hypothesis controlling for financial distress 
 (1) (2) 
Variable A_RAM i,t A_WCA i,t 
   
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.0945*** -0.0021 
 (3.520) (-1.004) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.0513** -0.0014* 
 (2.882) (-1.933) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0300 0.0003 
 (1.544) (0.159) 
DEFAULT_DTE i,t-1 0.0617*** 0.0030* 
 (3.099) (1.996) 
MTBi,t -0.0007 0.0001 
 (-0.493) (1.062) 
LEVi,t -0.1286*** -0.0029 
 (-4.164) (-1.583) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0173** -0.0001 
 (-2.715) (-0.121) 
ROAi,t -0.0594 0.0115** 
 (-0.733) (2.210) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0003 -0.0014 
 (-0.016) (-1.127) 
Z_SCOREi,t-1 -0.0007 -0.0001 
 (-0.714) (-0.782) 
A_WCAi,t -0.2121  
 (-1.348)  
A_RAMi,t  -0.0014 
  (-1.405) 
Constant 0.1008* 0.0018 
 (2.083) (0.911) 
   
Observations 2,083 2,083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.032 -0.001 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_WCAi,t is 
working capital discretionary accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-
years that are between 0% and 15% away from the interest coverage covenant 
violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for 
firm-years that are in technical default on interest coverage and zero otherwise, 
CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% 
away from the debt to EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, 
DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on 
debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is 
leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, 
ROAi,t is return on asset, NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets, and Z_SCOREi,t-1 is the 
Taffler Z-score. 
***/**/* 





                                                        Table 2.7 
                                        The debt covenant hypothesis including net worth covenant  
 (1) (2) 
Variables  A_RAM i,t A_WCA i,t 
   
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.0960*** -0.0020 
 (3.658) (-0.964) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.0517** -0.0014* 
 (2.764) (-1.838) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0322 0.0002 
 (1.664) (0.137) 
DEFAULT_DTE i,t-1 0.0628*** 0.0031* 
 (3.103) (2.160) 
CLOSE_NW i,t-1 0.0115 0.0015 
 (0.540) (0.671) 
DEFAULT_NW i,t-1 -0.0467** 0.0016 
 (-2.693) (1.216) 
MTBi,t -0.0000 0.0000 
 (-0.016) (0.640) 
LEVi,t -0.1136*** -0.0031 
 (-3.327) (-1.657) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0262*** 0.0002 
 (-3.910) (0.309) 
ROAi,t -0.0822 0.0086* 
 (-1.115) (1.924) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0134 -0.0016 
 (-1.097) (-1.174) 
A_WCAi,t -0.1946  
 (-1.127)  
A_RAMi,t  -0.0013 
  (-1.167) 
Constant 0.1637*** -0.0001 
 (3.251) (-0.026) 
   
Observations 2,083 2,083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035 -0.002 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_WCAi,t is working 
capital discretionary accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are 
between 0% and 15% away from the interest coverage covenant violation threshold 
and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in 
technical default on interest coverage and zero otherwise, CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal 
to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from the debt to EBITDA 
covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one 
for firm-years that are in technical default on debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, 
CLOSE_NWi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away 
from the net worth covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, 
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DEFAULT_NWi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on net 
worth and zero otherwise, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, 
MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, 
and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
                               ***/**/* 








































                                                        Table 2.8 
                                  The debt covenant hypothesis excluding financial crisis period  
   (1)  (2) 
Variables   A_RAM i,t  A_WCA i,t 
   
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.1027*** -0.0038 
 (3.542) (-1.880) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.0634** -0.0007 
 (3.228) (-1.039) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0219 0.0012 
 (1.039) (0.782) 
DEFAULT_DTE i,t-1 0.0517* 0.0038** 
 (2.160) (2.350) 
MTBi,t 0.0010 0.0001 
 (0.612) (1.153) 
LEVi,t -0.1713*** -0.0041** 
 (-7.753) (-2.522) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0229*** -0.0002 
 (-3.996) (-0.611) 
ROAi,t -0.0949 0.0113** 
 (-1.117) (2.287) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0159 -0.0024 
 (-1.176) (-1.404) 
A_WCAi,t -0.1527  
 (-0.857)  
A_RAMi,t  -0.0010 
  (-0.875) 
Constant 0.1488*** 0.0032 
 (3.716) (1.640) 
   
Observations 1,642 1,642 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 -0.001 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_WCAi,t is 
working capital discretionary accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-
years that are between 0% and 15% away from the interest coverage covenant 
violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-
years that are in technical default on interest coverage and zero otherwise, 
CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away 
from the debt to EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, 
DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on 
debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is 
leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t 
is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
***/**/* 





                                                      Table 2.9 
                                             The debt covenant hypothesis for Dealscan sample 
             (1)             (2)             (3)          (4) 
Variables A_RAMi,t A_WCAi,t A_RAMi,t A_WCAi,t 
     
IC_SLACKi,t-1 0.0017 -0.0005   
 (1.352) (-1.080)   
DTE_SLACKi,t-1   -0.0042* -0.0016** 
   (-2.024) (-2.760) 
MTBi,t -0.0030 0.0054*** 0.0062 0.0004 
 (-0.476) (3.296) (0.723) (0.084) 
LEVi,t 0.0021 -0.0178 0.1443 -0.0540 
 (0.024) (-1.039) (0.662) (-1.432) 
MVi,t-1 0.0108 -0.0022 -0.0002 -0.0025 
 (1.066) (-1.033) (-0.039) (-1.688) 
ROAi,t -0.4207* 0.0740** -0.2510 0.0297 
 (-1.804) (2.320) (-0.810) (0.458) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0354 0.0083 0.0260 0.0013 
 (-0.826) (1.581) (0.701) (0.111) 
A_WCAi,t 2.5171***  1.6776**  
 (7.928)  (2.619)  
A_RAMi,t  0.0640***  0.0707* 
  (3.216)  (1.795) 
Constant -0.0464 0.0115 -0.0167 0.0304* 
 (-0.757) (1.184) (-0.388) (1.991) 
     
Observations 150 150 67 67 
Adjusted R-squared 0.147 0.205 0.082 0.179 
Notes  
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. A_RAMi,t is 
aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_WCAi,t is working capital discretionary 
accruals, IC_SLACKi,t-1 is the interest coverage covenant slack, DTE_PROXYi,t-1 is the debt to 
EBITDA covenant slack, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net 
operating assets. 
***/**/* 












                                                    Table 2.10 
                                  An alternative specification for threshold value (1)       
                                     (1)   (2) 
Variable                               A_RAM i,t     A_WCA i,t 
   
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.0385 -0.0008 
 (1.610) (-0.468) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.0483** -0.0007 
 (3.003) (-0.342) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0912*** 0.0005 
 (3.793) (0.186) 
DEFAULT_DTE i,t-1 0.1233*** 0.0002 
 (6.934) (0.113) 
MTBi,t -0.0007 0.0001 
 (-0.394) (1.142) 
LEVi,t -0.2112*** -0.0023 
 (-5.075) (-0.929) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0179*** -0.0003 
 (-3.168) (-0.844) 
ROAi,t 0.0453 0.0052 
 (0.689) (1.295) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0070 -0.0018 
 (-0.439) (-1.297) 
A_WCAi,t -0.1892  
 (-1.245)  
A_RAMi,t  -0.0013 
  (-1.263) 
Constant 0.1047** 0.0031 
 (2.532) (1.682) 
   
Observations 2,083 2,083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042 -0.003 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. A_RAMi,t is 
aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_WCAi,t is working capital discretionary 
accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from the 
interest coverage covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to 
one for firm-years that are in technical default on interest coverage and zero otherwise, 
CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from the debt to 
EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for 
firm-years that are in technical default on debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, MTBi,t is the 
market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
             ***/**/* 








                                                       Table 2.11 
                                      An alternative specification for threshold value (2)    
 (1) (2) 
Variable                                   A_RAM i,t   A_WCA i,t 
   
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.0951*** 0.0009 
 (5.671) (1.084) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.1216*** -0.0030 
 (6.708) (-1.762) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0221 0.0015 
 (1.137) (0.980) 
DEFAULT_DTE i,t-1 0.0535** 0.0042** 
 (2.672) (2.815) 
MTBi,t -0.0004 0.0001 
 (-0.231) (1.289) 
LEVi,t -0.1773*** -0.0035* 
 (-4.470) (-1.786) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0183*** -0.0003 
 (-3.223) (-0.864) 
ROAi,t 0.0313 0.0088 
 (0.473) (1.614) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0047 -0.0019 
 (-0.304) (-1.384) 
A_WCAi,t -0.1983  
 (-1.178)  
A_RAMi,t  -0.0014 
  (-1.200) 
Constant 0.1022** 0.0030* 
 (2.479) (1.919) 
   
Observations 2,083 2,083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0450 -0.0007 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. A_RAMi,t is 
aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_WCAi,t is working capital discretionary 
accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from the 
interest coverage covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to 
one for firm-years that are in technical default on interest coverage and zero otherwise, 
CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from the debt to 
EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for 
firm-years that are in technical default on debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, MTBi,t is the 
market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
             ***/**/* 








                                                     Table 2.12                       
                                         Alternative measure for accruals management 
 (1) 
Variable A_WCA i,t 
  
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.0056 
 (0.858) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.0020 
 (0.482) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 -0.0045 
 (-0.906) 


















Adjusted R-squared 0.001 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by 
year. A_WCAi,t is working capital discretionary accruals, A_RAMi,t is 
aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is 
equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from the 
interest coverage covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, 
DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical 
default on interest coverage and zero otherwise, CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is 
equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from the 
debt to EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, 
DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical 
default on debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, MTBi,t is the market-to-
book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net 
operating assets. 
               ***/**/* 





                                                     Table 2.13 
                              Alternative measures for real activities manipulation  
  (1) (2) 
Variable                         A_PROD i,t A_CFO i,t 
   
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.1055*** 0.0169
* 
 (4.498) (1.731) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.0445* 0.0124 
 (2.052) (1.629) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0017 0.0079 
 (0.102) (1.120) 
DEFAULT_DTE i,t-1 0.0199 0.0207** 
 (0.870) (2.582) 
MTBi,t 0.0026** -0.0022** 
 (2.342) (-2.531) 
LEVi,t -0.0876** -0.0167 
 (-2.620) (-0.641) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0098** -0.0062*** 
 (-2.749) (-3.057) 
ROAi,t 0.0051 0.1303*** 
 (0.154) (5.844) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0161** 0.0140 
 (-2.374) (1.566) 
A_WCAi,t 0.5837*** 0.1586** 
 (5.723) (2.663) 
Constant 0.0582** 0.0215 
 (2.625) (1.349) 
   
Observations 2,001 2,001 
Adjusted R-squared 0.032 0.015 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. A_PRODi,t is 
abnormal production costs, A_DISXi,t is abnormal discretionary expenses, A_WCAi,t is 
working capital discretionary accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are 
between 0% and 15% away from the interest coverage covenant violation threshold and zero 
otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on 
interest coverage and zero otherwise, CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are 
between 0% and 15% away from the debt to EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero 
otherwise, DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on 
debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage 
ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, 
and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
                      ***/**/* 




                                                      Table 2.14 
                         Alternative aggregated real activities manipulation measures         
   (1)  (2) 
Variable                       A_RAM 1i,t   A_RAM2i,t 
   
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.0794*** 0.0166 
 (3.145) (1.083) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.0376** 0.0104 
 (2.679) (0.833) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0171 0.0220* 
 (1.050) (2.174) 
DEFAULT_DTE i,t-1 0.0264* 0.0277* 
 (1.823) (1.792) 
MTBi,t 0.0000 -0.0021** 
 (0.027) (-2.676) 
LEVi,t -0.0645** -0.0247 
 (-2.433) (-1.212) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0155*** -0.0047** 
 (-3.215) (-2.762) 
ROAi,t 0.0499 -0.0871* 
 (0.969) (-1.920) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0005 0.0047 
 (-0.038) (0.488) 
A_WCAi,t 0.7501*** 0.9473*** 
 (6.060) (16.870) 
Constant 0.0793* 0.0243 
 (2.167) (1.518) 
   
Observations 2,083 2,083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027 0.106 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
A_RAM1i,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, defined as the 
sum of the abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, 
A_RAM2i,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, defined as the 
sum of the abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal cash flows from 
operations, A_WCAi,t is working capital discretionary accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is 
equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from the interest 
coverage covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is 
equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on interest coverage and 
zero otherwise, CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% 
and 15% away from the debt to EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero 
otherwise, DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical 
default on debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, 
LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
                      ***/**/* 
indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed). 
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                                                       Table 2.15 
       The debt covenant hypothesis controlling for industry effect  
 (1) (2) 
Variable A_RAM i,t A_WCA i,t 
   
CLOSE_ICi,t-1 0.0960*** -0.0021 
 (3.603) (-0.985) 
DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 0.0561** -0.0015* 
 (2.966) (-1.885) 
CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 0.0323 0.0004 
 (1.682) (0.233) 
DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 0.0626*** 0.0033** 
 (3.093) (2.233) 
MTBi,t -0.0006 0.0001 
 (-0.386) (0.840) 
LEVi,t -0.1417*** -0.0036 
 (-4.236) (-1.625) 
MVi,t-1 -0.0192*** -0.0002 
 (-3.287) (-0.517) 
ROAi,t -0.1054 0.0094* 
 (-1.297) (1.912) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.0074 -0.0022 
 (-0.446) (-1.479) 
A_WCAi,t -0.2101  
 (-1.332)  
A_RAMi,t  -0.0014 
  (-1.378) 
Constant 0.1137** 0.0034* 
 (2.284) (1.883) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
   
Observations 2,083 2,083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.028 -0.008 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. A_RAMi,t is 
aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_WCAi,t is working capital 
discretionary accruals, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% 
and 15% away from the interest coverage covenant violation threshold and zero 
otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on 
interest coverage and zero otherwise, CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that 
are between 0% and 15% away from the debt to EBITDA covenant violation threshold 
and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical 
default on debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t 
is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t is 
return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
            ***/**/* 






                                                       Table 2.16 
                   The debt covenant hypothesis using total earnings management   
 (1) 
Variable          TEMi,t 
  
CLOSE_IC i,t-1 0.0848*** 
 (3.263) 
DEFAULT_IC i,t-1 0.0311** 
 (2.239) 
CLOSE_DTE i,t-1 0.0244 
 (1.536) 
















Adjusted R-squared 0.078 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
TEMi,t is total earnings management, defined as the sum of the working capital 
discretionary accruals and the aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, 
CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away 
from the interest coverage covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, 
DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on 
interest coverage and zero otherwise, CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-
years that are between 0% and 15% away from the debt to EBITDA covenant 
violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for 
firm-years that are in technical default on debt to EBITDA and zero otherwise, 
MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t is return on asset, and NOAi,t-1 is 
net operating assets. 
                           ***/**/* 








                                                       Table 2.17 
             The debt covenant hypothesis before and after mandatory 
IFRS adoption using total earnings management   
 (1) 












IFRSi,t* CLOSE_ICi,t-1 -0.0655 
 (-1.400) 
IFRSi,t* DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 -0.0344 
 (-1.300) 
IFRSi,t* CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 0.0566* 
 (1.933) 
















Adjusted R-squared 0.078 
Notes  
t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. TEMi,t is 
total earnings management, defined as the sum of the working capital discretionary 
accruals and the aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, CLOSE_ICi,t-1 is 
equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from the interest 
coverage covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, DEFAULT_ICi,t-1 is equal to 
one for firm-years that are in technical default on interest coverage and zero otherwise, 
CLOSE_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are between 0% and 15% away from 
the debt to EBITDA covenant violation threshold and zero otherwise, 
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DEFAULT_DTEi,t-1 is equal to one for firm-years that are in technical default on debt to 
EBITDA and zero otherwise, IFRSi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for 
observations after 2005 and 0 otherwise, MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio, LEVi,t is 
leverage ratio, MVi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, ROAi,t  is 
return on asset and NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets. 
***/**/* 





























                                                     Table 2.18 
                                                            Percentiles of the Debt Covenants 
Variable 10
th
       15
th
      20
th
    25
th
     30
th
   50
th
     70
th
   75
th
       80
th
    85
th
   90
th
  
            
ICi,t 1.82    2.92    3.70 4.35 4.96 7.13   10.73   12.05    13.93  16.47  21.91 
DTEi,t 0.61    0.82    1.01 1.19 1.34 2.06    2.80  3.04     3.36     3.77 4.56 
N     2,083      
      Notes       


























                                           
 
3.1 Introduction  
 In recent years there has been considerable research into why firms manage earnings 
and the events that might prompt such activity. One particular event that provides the 
motivation to manage earnings is the possibility of violating debt covenants. This originally 
predicted by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) they termed it the debt covenant hypothesis. 
Existing studies, focussing on large samples or firms that entered technical default, as a 
whole find results consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 
1994; Franz, HassabElnaby, & Lobo, 2014; Sweeney, 1994;). Firms with debt covenants can 
raise capital via seasoned equity offerings (hereafter SEOs) and this may motivate them to 
window dress their financial performance to induce investors to take up their shares. Prior 
studies document that earnings are inflated around SEOs (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; 
Shivakumar, 2000; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998; Yoon & Miller, 2002).   
       Firms may conduct SEOs for different reasons. Several papers find that firms conduct 
SEOs to use the funds raised for investments and for debt reductions (e.g., Kim & Weisbach, 
2008) whereas other papers document that a near-term need for cash is the primary reason 
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for conducting SEOs (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2010). Therefore, it is not clear 
from the above studies whether firms improve their financial situation and, in the process, 
become less susceptible to debt covenant violations following SEOs. In other words, the 
continued use of earnings management to avoid covenant violations in the post-issue period 
remains an open question. This is an important issue to investigate because firms can 
improve their debt covenant financial ratios via SEOs and thus, may reduce managing 
earnings to avoid covenant violations thereafter. For instance, SEO firms can improve their 
cash flow based interest coverage ratio directly or indirectly by employing the funds to 
reduce long-term debt or to make investment, respectively.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant 
hypothesis. Specifically, it tests whether SEO firms’ use of earnings management to avoid 
covenant violations is different in the post-issue period relative to the pre-issue period. A 
firm is likely to employ real activities manipulation (hereafter RAM) as an earnings 
management method because of two reasons. First, RAM is more difficult to detect 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012) and therefore may go unnoticed by auditors and market 
participants.. Second, RAM has more direct cash flow implications (Cohen & Zarowin, 
2010) than other earnings management methods.  As such, I predict that the use of RAM to 
avoid covenant violations decreases following SEOs.  
The paper tests the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis in the UK setting. 
The UK provides an interesting laboratory for this test for two reasons. First, there has been 
a sharp increase in UK SEOs through private placements from 2004 and the latter has 
become a common type of SEO in the UK since that time.
26
 Private placements are mainly 
made by firms in financial difficulties and such SEO firms are likely to use the raised funds 
                                                          
26
 Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006) note that the issue of private placements has 
increased in the UK. Armitage, Dionysiou, and Gonzalez (2014) show that private placements are common in 
the UK after 2004.  
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for reducing debt or recapitalization (Wu, 2004). This implies that private placements are 
more likely to impact on the debt covenant hypothesis directly and within a short period of 
time. Second, the UK has a debt-friendly bankruptcy code implying that covenant violation 
in the UK entitles the lending bank – and by extension all banks through cross-default 
clauses
 – to place that firm directly into receivership and liquidate its assets (Acharya, 
Sundaram, & John, 2011).This provides another motivation for why UK firms are likely to 
employ the raised funds directly to improve their financial situation and, in the process, 
become less susceptible to covenant violations. 
UK firms are not obliged to disclose covenant information and so extant studies are 
based on interviews or surveys (Citron, 1992; Moir & Sudarsanam, 2007). This has also 
been noted by Christensen, Lee, and Walker (2009) who highlight the lack of public 
covenant data in the UK and therefore they use proxies such as interest cover ratio for the 
likelihood and costs of covenant violation. They use the interest cover ratio because it is the 
most commonly used covenant in UK debt contracting and is consistent with the limited 
covenant information on UK firms available in Dealscan. This paper uses two strategies to 
estimate a slack proxy for interest coverage to overcome the lack of covenant data. First, it 
selects those UK firms that are likely to be constrained by a covenant(s) or more importantly 
by an interest coverage covenant. Accordingly, I exclude firms without outstanding debt 
because these firms will not have a loan covenant. Firms with negative lagged EBITDA are 
also excluded as such firms are less likely to have an interest coverage covenant (Demerjian, 
2007). Second, it estimates an interest coverage covenant slack proxy as interest coverage 
ratio divided by judiciously chosen threshold values. To determine the latter, I first identify 
the average threshold value for the interest coverage covenant reported in the literature (e.g., 
Moir & Sudarsanam, 2007) and then adjust it for industry and year effects. 
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 I test the effects of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis using a difference-in-
differences research design that includes a treatment sample of 846 observations covering 
232 UK SEOs up to 3 years before and after issuing years with outstanding debt and positive 
lagged EBITDA from the period 2005-2013. To compare the change in the use of RAM to 
avoid interest coverage covenant violations from the pre-issue period to the post-issue period 
for the treatment sample with corresponding changes for benchmark firms, I employ 690 
observations covering 232 non-SEOs with outstanding debt and positive lagged EBITDA 
from the period 2005-2013. I select these matching firms based on industry, size, and 
performance criteria in the pre-issue year from all listed non-SEO UK firms with outstanding 
debt and positive lagged EBITDA. I include the benchmark sample to control for the non-
SEO related factors that may affect the debt covenant hypothesis.  
I find that the use of RAM to avoid the possibility of interest coverage covenant 
violations decreases from the pre-issue period to the post-issue period for SEO firms relative 
to the corresponding change for benchmark firms. This implies that firms improve their 
financial situation using SEO proceeds and, in the process, become less susceptible to debt 
covenant violations following SEOs. The results show that the decrease in the use of RAM 
in the post SEO period to avoid the likelihood of breaching interest coverage covenant is 
more pervasive among SEO firms with low market to book ratios or high financial leverage. 
Furthermore, using accruals management and classification shifting measures of earnings 
management I find that firms do not engage in these manipulation methods to avoid the 
possibility of interest coverage covenant violations and this behaviour does not change 
following SEOs. Lastly, I find that the main results are robust to the exclusion of SEO firms 
with syndicated loans and to an alternative proxy for covenant violation.   
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This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops my main hypotheses. Section 3 
presents the research design and discusses the data and sample selection. Section 4 reports 
the empirical results and Section 5 shows the robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.  
3.2 Hypothesis development  
The debt-covenant hypothesis implies that firms manage earnings to avoid covenant 
violations because the violating of them is costly (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Several 
studies confirm that debt covenant violations are costly. Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini, 
Smith, and Sufi (2009) find that firms’ future investment decreases as a result of covenant 
violations Earlier studies test the debt-covenant hypothesis by using the gearing ratio as a 
proxy for debt covenant tightness or using firms that enter technical default and find 
consistent results (e.g., Ayres, 1986; Daley & Vigeland, 1983; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994). Subsequent studies which are based on large Dealscan samples find 
supportive results for the debt covenant hypothesis. For instance, Franz et al. (2014) find that 
firms engage in RAM and accruals management to avoid violating covenants and this 
behaviour increases with the tightness of the covenant slack. These studies mainly use US 
samples to test the debt covenant hypothesis as there is a lack of public covenant data in 
other countries.  
Firms with debt covenants can raise capital via SEOs and this may motivate them to 
manipulate earnings. Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) examine the use of earnings 
management around SEOs. Using abnormal accruals as an earnings management proxy, they 
find that firms inflate earnings at the time of SEOs and operating performance declines in the 
post-issue period due to accrual reversals. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) extend these studies by 
investigating both RAM and AM around SEOs. Their findings show that firms engage in 
RAM along with accrual-based activities in the year of the offerings and the decrease in 
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post-SEO performance is mainly due to RAM rather than accruals management. These US-
based studies are also supported by Iqbal, Espenlaub, and Strong (2009) who examine 
earnings management around SEOs in the UK. Their results indicate that SEO firms engage 
in discretionary current accruals but not discretionary long-term accruals around offerings 
and their return performance improves in the pre-issue period but deteriorates in the post-
issue period due to accrual reversals. 
SEOs can be made by issuing new (primary) shares or offering existing (secondary) 
shares, where the former brings cash inflows to the firm and the latter to the insiders. SEO 
firms with primary shares may reduce the need for earnings management to avoid covenant 
violations in the post-issue period. Christensen et al. (2009) document that interest coverage 
is the most commonly used accounting covenant in UK debt contracting. UK firms 
conducting SEOs can improve their interest coverage ratio in two ways. First, they can use 
the proceeds to reduce long-term debt and, thus, directly improve their interest coverage 
ratio. Second, they can invest the raised capital which may increase earnings and, therefore, 
improve their interest coverage ratio. However, the return on any investment may take time 
to come through and improve the financial performance of the company.  Nevertheless, in 
both cases firms are likely to reduce the use of earnings management to avoid breaching 
interest coverage covenant in the post-SEO period.  Kim and Weisbach (2008) analyse how 
firms use the funds raised through SEOs. They document increases in investments such as 
R&D and capital expenditures following SEOs. Walker and Yost (2008) report that the most 
SEO firms are expected to use the proceeds for investment or debt reduction while mainly 
their investment increases in the post-issue period. Similarly, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Stulz (2010) find that capital expenditures increase after the SEO but a near-term need for 
cash is the primary reason for conducting equity offerings.  
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The effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis is more likely to be detected in 
those firms that conduct SEOs via private placements. This form of SEO, which is 
commonly used in the UK, is mainly made by firms in financial difficulties to use the raised 
funds for reducing debt or recapitalization (Wu, 2004). Furthermore, firms conducting 
private placements appear not to manage earnings around such events unlike other types of 
SEOs in the UK (Dionysiou, 2015). This suggests that there is less likely to be a reversal in a 
firm’s operating performance in the post-issue period relative to the pre-issue period that 
typically occurs due to the use of earnings management around SEOs. The implication is that 
private placement firms can improve their financial situation in the post-issue period. Even if 
there is a reversal, it affects firms’ earnings but not cash flows (Iqbal et al., 2009) and 
improving the latter is more important for avoiding breaching covenants like interest 
coverage.   
Although a number of earnings management methods are available to management I 
would suggest that RAM is more likely to be employed for avoiding interest coverage 
covenant violations for two reasons. First, RAM is more pervasive because it is more 
difficult to detect (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). Second, firms are more likely to use 
RAM to avoid infringing EBITDA-based interest coverage because RAM has direct cash 
flow implications (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). Thus, I expect that the use of RAM to remain 
within interest coverage covenant limits decreases following SEOs. Based on the above 
discussion, I hypothesize the following: 
H1: The use of RAM to avoid interest coverage covenant violations decreases following 
SEOs.  
I expect that the decrease in the use of RAM to remain within interest coverage 
covenant limits subsequent to SEOs occurs primarily in firms with low market to book 
ratios. Kim and Weisbach (2008) document SEOs are made for investment and exploiting 
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favorable market conditions. Specifically, their results show that SEO firms with low market 
to book ratios (low valuation firms) tend to use the raised funds for investment and debt 
reduction while SEO firms with high market to book ratios (high valuation firms) keep them 
as cash. These findings suggest that firms with low market to books ratios improve their 
interest coverage ratio and thus decrease the use of RAM to avoid interest coverage covenant 
violations following SEOs.  More formally: 
H2: The decrease in the use of RAM to avoid interest coverage covenant violations is 
more pervasive among firms with low market to books ratios following SEOs.  
The use of SEO proceeds can vary depending on the level of financial leverage. Specifically, 
firms with high financial leverage are likely to use the raised funds differently relative to 
firms with low financial leverage. The former are more likely to employ SEO proceeds to 
reduce debt compared to the latter. High-debt firms have strong monitoring from lender 
firms (Ahn & Choi, 2009; Anagnostopoulou & Tsekrekos, 2016) and thus they have 
incentives to reduce debt which directly improves their interest coverage ratio. 
Consequently, I expect that the decrease in the use of RAM to avoid infringing interest 
coverage covenant is more pervasive among firms with high financial leverage following 
SEOs. More formally:  
H3: The decrease in the use of RAM to avoid interest coverage covenant violations is 
more pervasive among firms with high financial leverage following SEOs.  
3.3 Research design and sample   
3.3.1 Real activities manipulation 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines RAM as departures from normal operating practices, 
motivated my managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain 
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financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations. Certain RAM 
methods, such as reduction of R&D and price discounts, are possibly optimal actions in 
certain economic circumstances. If managers, however, engage in these activities more 
extensively than is normal given their economic circumstances they are engaging in RAM. 
Roychowdhury (2006) develops models to derive normal levels of operating activities to 
detect RAM. I examine three RAM proxies: abnormal levels of cash flows from operations 
(A_CFO), abnormal levels of production costs (A_PROD) and abnormal levels of 
discretionary expenses (A_DISX) following Roychowdhury (2006).
27
 A_CFO, A_PROD and 
A_DISX are residuals from the following regressions, respectively:  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
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+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                        (3) 
where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations for firm i in year t; Si,t is sales for firm i in year t; 
PRODi,t is production costs for firm i in year t, defined as cost of sales plus change in 
inventory; DISXi,t is discretionary expenses for firm i in year t, defined as SG&A (selling, 
general and administrative) expenses plus R&D expenses. Regressions (1), (2), and (3) are 
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year.
28
  
       Firms with either abnormally low cash flows from operations or abnormally low 
discretionary expenses or abnormally high production costs are considered as engaging in 
RAM. Abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal cash flows from operations are 
                                                          
27
 I find similar results if I add returns on assets to Roychowdhury (2006)’s models to control extreme 
operating performance similar to Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker (2011).  
28
  I require at least 6 observations per industry-year to ensure that I have sufficient data for estimation of 
earnings management proxies following Athanasakou et al. (2011). The Global Industry Classification Scheme 
(GICS) for the classification of industries is applied because it gives more accurate empirical results (e.g., 
Bhojraj, Lee, & Oler, 2003). 
68 
 
multiplied by minus one similar to prior studies to ease the interpretation of RAM measures. 
An aggregated measure of RAM (A_RAM) is also calculated by combining the three 
individual proxies to measure the total effect of RAM (Franz et al., 2014). Thus, a positive 
value of any RAM proxy or its aggregated measure is regarded as real earnings 
manipulation.  
3.3.2 Debt covenants 
Disclosure requirements on debt covenants are far less demanding in the UK than in the 
USA. UK firms are only required to disclose the class, amount, active date and maturity date 
of the debt whereas they are required to disclose fully in the USA detailed information about 
covenants and performance pricing (Chatterjee, 2006). The Dealscan database provides 
covenant information only for some loans in UK debt contracting. The majority of these 
loans have at least one accounting-based debt covenant which is consistent with US studies 
(e.g., Roberts & Sufi, 2009). Of these, interest coverage is the most frequently occurring 
covenant. This is in line with the relevant UK and US studies that find interest coverage is 
the most commonly used covenant (Christensen et al., 2009; Roberts & Sufi, 2009). Based 
on the above, I use minimum interest coverage as the accounting-based debt covenant.  
I develop a covenant slack proxy for interest coverage to examine the effect of SEOs on 
the debt covenant hypothesis. The proxy in the spirit of Demerjian and Owens (2014) is 
estimated as follows: 
        𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡
                                                                                                                                 (4) 
where Actuali,t is the interest coverage ratio for firm i in year t; Thresholdi,t is threshold value 
of the interest coverage covenant for firm i in year t. The interest coverage ratio is calculated 
using the standard definition specified by Demerjian and Owens (2014). Minimum interest 
coverage is EBITDA divided by interest expense. To determine threshold values for interest 
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coverage, I first identify what is the average threshold value for the interest coverage 
covenant reported in the literature (Moir & Sudarsanam, 2007; Rhodes, 2016)
29,30
. I then 
adjust this average threshold value to obtain interest coverage threshold values for each 
industry-year group of companies.
31
 Based on formula (4), a covenant slack proxy of less 
than one implies violation of the minimum interest coverage covenant.     
3.3.3 Regression model 
To test the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), I use a 
difference in differences research design which deals with confounding events. Specifically, 
I employ the following OLS regression model: 
     𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐶_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝐶_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐼𝐶_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1
× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡    + 𝛼6𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐼𝐶_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                                                                                                                                              (5) 
 where EMi,t is earnings management proxy for firm i in year t that refers to one of the 
following RAM proxies, aggregated measure of RAM (A_RAMi,t), abnormal levels of 
production costs (A_PRODi,t), abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (A_DISXi,t), and 
abnormal levels of cash flows from operations (A_CFOi,t); IC_PROXYi,t-1 is an interest 
coverage covenant slack proxy; SEOi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for SEO firms 
and 0 otherwise; POSTi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for both SEO and non-SEO 
firms in the post-issue years and 0 otherwise. My variable of interest is the coefficient on the 
                                                          
29
  Gamba and Triantis (2014) use a similar approach.  
30
  They document that the interest coverage covenant generally has a threshold value of 3.  I identify that the 
15
th
 percentile interest coverage figure in my sample has the value close to this average threshold value. Thus, I 
use the 15
th
 percentile of the interest coverage to determine my threshold values. In order to check sensitivity of 
the main results, I also use the 10
th
 percentile of the interest coverage and the 20
th
 percentile of the interest 
coverage to obtain my threshold values and re-run the main regressions. The results indicate that these 
sensitivity tests yield qualitatively similar findings.  
31
  I consider industry effects because they can impact debt contracts via their effects on firm-level 
fundamentals and probability of default related risk premiums (MacKay & Phillips, 2005). I also consider year 
effects to control for economic factors. 
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triple interaction term (𝛼7). This coefficient captures the change in the use of RAM to avoid 
the possibility of interest coverage covenant violations from the pre-issue period to the post-
issue period for SEO firms relative to the corresponding change for benchmark firms. Since I 
multiply A_CFOi,t  and A_DISXi,t by minus one to simplify the interpretation of my earnings 
management proxies, Hypothesis 1 predicts 𝛼7 to be positive in model (5). 
 Ci,t  are control variables for MVi,t , Z_SCOREi,t, CAPEXi,t, GROWTHi,t,  LEVi,t, CLi,t, MTBit, 
and ISSUEi,t. These are added to the regression model (5) because they are expected to affect 
the use of earnings management (e.g., Bozzolan, Fabrizi, Mallin, & Michelon, 2015; He, 
2016; Karampinis & Hevas, 2013; Roychowdhury, 2006). MVi,t is the natural logarithm of 
the market value of equity for firm i in year t and is included to control for firm size. 
Z_SCOREi,t  is the Taffler Z-score and is added to control for financial distress. CAPEXi,t is 
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. This is included to control for capital 
intensity. LEVi,t is leverage ratio, defined as the sum of, long term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by total assets. This is included as a control for capital structure. CLi,t is the 
ratio of current liabilities to total asset and is added to control for short-term liabilities. 
GROWTHi,t is the percentage change in sales. MTBi,t is the market to book ratio, defined as 
the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. GROWTHi,t and MTBi,t are 
included to control for growth opportunities. ISSUEi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to1 in 
the SEO year and 0 otherwise. This is included to control for the use of earnings 
management in the year when firms conduct SEOs. All variables are winsorised at the 1 
percent and 99 percent levels to eliminate the impact of outliers.  
Since the above regression model involves panel data, I determine whether there is cross 
sectional or time series dependence to avoid biased standard errors. Following the Petersen 
(2009) methodology, it is concluded that there is cross sectional dependence since the White 
standard errors are not the same as the standard errors clustered by year whereas they are the 
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same as the standard errors clustered by firms. Accordingly, standard errors clustered by 
year are used to mitigate this problem.  
3.3.4 Data and sample 
My treatment sample includes all UK (dead and live) listed firms that conduct SEOs 
during the period between 2008 and 2012.
32
 I focus on the period three years before and after 
each firms SEO and treat them as the pre and post-SEO periods, respectively. This indicates 
that my treatment sample starts from the year 2005. The latter is chosen as the starting point 
because the EU (European Union) requires all European listed firms to follow IFRS from the 
beginning of 2005. The Thomson 1 database is used to identify SEO firms.
33
 Accounting 
data are obtained from Compustat Global. Following existing studies, financial and utility 
firms are excluded from my sample because of their different financial reporting 
environment and highly predictable earnings, respectively. Equity offerings with secondary 
shares are excluded from the sample because they do not bring cash inflows into the firm. 
Firms that conduct SEOs within the previous 3 years prior to my treatment sample period are 
excluded to fully capture the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis. Since there is a 
lack of explicit covenant data in the UK, I tailor my sample to include those UK firms that 
are likely to be constrained by threshold values for the minimum interest coverage covenant. 
Thus, I exclude firms with zero outstanding long-term debt and negative lagged EBITDA.
34
 
Consequently, the final treatment sample contains 232 SEOs and 846 observations.   
I include a benchmark sample to control for the effect of potentially confounding 
concurrent events. To do so, I, first, select firms from all non-SEO UK listed firms with 
                                                          
32
  Dead firms are also included to avoid survivorship bias.  
33
  Most of the SEOs in my sample are private placements.  
34 Roychowdhury (2006) states that debt covenant data are not readily available even for a large US sample. 
Therefore, he uses a proxy, the existence of debt. Demerjian (2007) finds that borrowers with negative earnings 
are less likely to have an interest coverage covenant. 
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outstanding debt and positive lagged EBITDA. Next, among these for each SEO firm I 
choose a matched non-SEO firm from the same industry with the closest size and 
performance in the pre-offer year. These selection criteria result in a benchmark sample of 
232 non-SEOs and 690 observations.  
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis  
Table 3.1, Panels A and B present descriptive statistics for my treatment and benchmark 
samples for the whole sample period and for the pre-issue year, respectively.  
                                                       [Table 3.1 around here] 
Panel A shows that although SEO and non-SEO firms have similar firm size (MV), they 
have different firm characteristics. Specifically, SEO firms are significantly more leveraged 
than non-SEO firms. The median (mean) leverage ratio (LEV) is 0.233 for SEO firms while 
it is 0.195 (0.213) for non-SEO firms. SEO firms are less financially healthy relative to non-
SEO firms as they have significantly lower median (mean) Z-score. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that my interest coverage slack proxy (IC_PROXY) is significantly lower for SEO 
firms than non-SEO firms. This indicates that SEO firms are potentially subject to tighter 
interest coverage covenant slack proxy. Furthermore, SEO firms have positive median 
(mean) values for all RAM measures unlike non-SEO firms. The medians (means) of these 
measures are significantly higher for SEO firms. Panel B also shows similar results for the 
pre-issue year. Specifically, SEO firms are more leveraged and more financially distressed 
than non-SEO firms and thus they have tighter interest coverage slack proxy in the pre-issue 
year. Overall, the results suggest that firms in poor financial health are more likely to have 
tighter covenant slack which are consistent with Franz et al. (2014).  
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Table 3.2, Panels A and B indicate how SEO and matched non-SEO firms’ leverage 
ratio, capital expenditures, cash holdings, and interest coverage ratio change around the issue 
year, respectively. This univariate analysis shows how SEO firms use the raised funds. This 
helps to determine whether such firms’ improve their interest coverage ratio following 
SEOs.  
                                                 [Table 3.2 around here] 
Panel A shows the median  leverage ratio (LEV) for SEO firms decreases from 0.24 in 
year -1 to 0.21 in year +1, and remains at this level by year +3.
35
 SEO firms’ median capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) goes down from 0.03 in year -1 to 0.02 in year +1, and remains stable 
by  year +3. The median of cash holdings (CASH) for SEO firms does not change in the 
post-issue years relative to the pre-issue year. These results imply that SEO firms appear to 
use the raised funds for reducing their debt and consequently this is likely to improve their 
interest coverage ratio. Not surprisingly, the median of my interest coverage slack proxy 
(IC_PROXY) goes up from 1.70 in year -1 to 1.91 in year +1, and increases to 2.35 by year 
+3. The implication is that firms decrease their debt which moves their interest coverage 
ratio further from their threshold levels following SEOs.  
Panel B indicates that matched non-SEO firms have different patterns for the medians of 
leverage ratio, capital expenditures, cash holdings, and interest coverage covenant slack 
proxy during the same time period compared to SEO firms. Univariate analysis also shows 
that non-SEO firms are much less leveraged than their SEO counterparts in year -1 and in 
line with this they have a higher interest coverage covenant slack proxy. However, the 
differences between SEO and non-SEO firms decrease in the post-issue year.  
 
                                                          
35
 I focus on the medians rather than the means as my sample distribution is skewed. The overall conclusion of 
my univariate analysis does not change if I also consider the means. 
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3.4.2 The effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis 
Table 3.3, reports the test results for Hypothesis 1 which predicts that the coefficient on 
IC_PROXY×SEO×POST interaction variable is positive. Columns (1) and (2)-(4) show the 
results for the total and individual RAM measures, respectively.  
                                                            [Table 3.3 around here] 
Column (1) indicates that the coefficient on IC_PROXY×SEO×POST interaction 
variable is positive and significant at the 5% significance level. This implies that the use of 
RAM to remain within interest coverage covenant limits decreases from the pre-issue period 
to the post-issue period for SEO firms relative to the corresponding change for benchmark 
firms. Focusing on the individual RAM measures, the coefficient on 
IC_PROXY×SEO×POST interaction variable is also significantly positive for abnormal 
levels of production costs (A_PROD) and discretionary expenses (A_DISX) dependent 
variables in columns (2) and (3), respectively. The implication is that firms decrease 
abnormal production and reduce cutting discretionary expenses to avoid the possibility of 
interest coverage covenant violations following SEOs. These results support Hypothesis 1. 
The results in Table 3.3 suggest that SEOs affect the debt covenant hypothesis as the use 
of RAM to avoid breaching interest coverage covenant decreases following SEOs.
36
 The 
implication is that firms become less susceptible to debt covenant violations using SEO 
proceeds and therefore decrease managing earnings. 
 
                                                          
36
  Regarding control variables, column (4) shows that the ISSUE dummy coefficient is significantly positive at 
the 5% significance level suggesting that issuing firms accelerate sales for window dressing in the year of the 
issue. I, however, do not find evidence for total RAM as shown by insignificant coefficients on ISSUE in 
columns (1). This is because most of the SEOs in my sample are private placements and the use of earnings 




3.4.3 Subgroup analysis 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms with low market to book ratios are more likely to 
decrease the use of RAM to remain within interest coverage covenant limits relative to firms 
with high market to book ratios following SEOs. In order to test this conjecture, the 
treatment sample (SEO firms) is divided into two groups based on the median market to 
book ratio in the pre-SEO year. Similarly, I also divide the control sample (non-SEO firms) 
into two groups. Firms in each sample below and above the medians are used as SEO and 
non-SEO firms with low and high market to book ratios, respectively. Regression (5) is then 
run separately for SOE and non-SOE firms with low market to book ratios and those with 
high market to book ratios. This allows us to compare SEO firms and non-SEO firms using 
the same criterion. The results are reported in Table 3.4.  
                                                       [Table 3.4 around here] 
I find that SEO firms with low market to book ratios decrease the use of RAM to remain 
within interest coverage covenant limits in the post-issue period relative to the pre-issue 
period as the coefficient on IC_PROXY×SEO×POST interaction variable is significantly 
positive in columns (1). By contrast, I do not find the same the same phenomenon for SEO 
firms with high market to book ratios since the coefficient on IC_PROXY×SEO×POST 
interaction variable is not significant in column (2). These findings support Hypothesis 2. 
Overall, the results suggest that my main findings are driven by SEO firms with low market 
to book ratios.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms with high financial leverage are more likely to decrease 
the use of RAM to remain within interest coverage covenant limits than firms with low 
financial leverage following SEOs. I again divide the treatment and control samples into two 
groups based on the median leverage ratio in the pre-SEO year. Firms in each sample above 
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and below the medians are used as SEO and non-SEO firms with high and low financial 
leverage, respectively. Regression (5) is then run separately for SOE and non-SOE firms 
with high financial leverage and those with low financial leverage. The results are reported 
in Table 3.5.  
                                                        [Table 3.5 around here] 
The table shows that SEO firms with high financial leverage decrease the use of RAM 
to avoid the possibility of interest coverage covenant violations in the post-issue period 
relative to the pre-issue period as the coefficient on IC_PROXY×SEO×POST interaction 
variable is significantly positive in columns (1). However, I do not find the same the same 
phenomenon for SEO firms with low financial leverage since the coefficient on 
IC_PROXY×SEO×POST interaction variable is not significant in column (2). These findings 
support Hypothesis 3. Overall, the results suggest that my main findings are driven by SEO 
firms with high financial leverage.  
3.5 Robustness checks   
3.5.1 Accruals management and classification shifting  
I also test the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis using accruals 
management and classification shifting measures of earnings management. I employ 
working capital discretionary accruals (A_WCA) as the accruals management measure for 
regression (5).
37
 This is because studies show that the former captures more subtle instances 
                                                          
37  I use modified Jones (1991) model to estimate AM by taking into account firm growth and operating 
performance similar to Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh (2014). Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) indicate that 
extreme operating performance should be controlled for to avoid inaccurate estimation of abnormal accruals. 
Thus, following Collins et al. (2014), I run the following regression to estimate normal working capital 
accruals: 
   
 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1






+ ∑ 𝛽3,𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑂𝐴_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽4,𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝐺_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 to 𝑡+ ∑ 𝛽5,𝑘𝑘 𝑀𝑉_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 +
                            ∑ 𝛽6,𝑘𝑘 𝑀𝐵_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽7,𝑘𝑘 𝐸𝑃_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡                                                                            (6) 
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of accruals management than total discretionary accruals in the UK (e.g. Peasnell, Pope, & 
Young, 2000).
38 The results are presented in Table 3.6, columns (1). They show that firms do 
not employ accruals management to remain within interest coverage covenant limits and this 
behaviour does not change following SEOs. This is probably because accruals management 
is not pervasively used and it has no direct cash flow implications (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; 
Zang, 2012). 
                                                [Table 3.6 around here] 
Regarding classification shifting, following Athanasakou et al. (2011) I use a dependent 
dummy variable, CS, that is equal to 1 for firms that have positive unexpected core 
earnings
39
 and higher I/B/E/S earnings
40
 than net income per share and 0 otherwise for 
regression (5). This captures those firms that are likely to engage in classification shifting by 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
where WCAi,t is working capital accruals for firm i in year t, calculated as the change in total current assets 
minus the change in cash minus the change in current liabilities minus the change in the current portion of long 
term debt; ATi,t-1 is total assets for firm i in year t-1; ∆CRi,t is the change in sales for firm i from year t-1 to year 
t minus the change in accounts receivable for firm i from year t-1 to year t; 𝑘 takes the values of 1, 2, 4, and 5; 
𝑅𝑂𝐴_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 is quintile dummies for the return on assets, defined as earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations scaled by lagged total assets. 𝑆𝐺_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 to 𝑡 is quintile dummies for the sales 
growth, defined as the change in sales from year t-1 to t divided by sales during year t-1. 𝑀𝑉_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
quintile dummies for the market value of equity as of last year t-1; 𝑀𝐵_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 is quintile dummies for the 
market to book equity as of year t-1; 𝐸𝑃_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 is quintile dummies for earnings to price, calculated as net 
income for year t-1 divided by ending stock price as of year t-1; Each quintile dummy takes the value of 1 if the 
corresponding firm characteristic belongs to that 𝑘’th quintile, and zero otherwise. Regression (6) is estimated 
cross-sectionally within industry-years and normal working capital accruals are estimated using the estimated 
coefficients from regression (6). The difference between actual and normal working capital accruals gives 
working capital discretionary accruals (A_WCA).  
38
  The other reason why I employ working capital discretionary accruals rather than total discretionary accruals 
is because I use EBITDA-based covenant (interest coverage).   
39
  Unexpected core earnings (UCE) are estimated following McVay (2006). UCE is the residual from the 
following regression estimated cross sectionally within industry-years: 
            𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡               (7) 
where CEi,t is core earnings for firm i in year t scaled by sales where the former is defined as sales minus cost 
of goods sold minus selling, general and administrative expenses ; ATOi,t is asset turnover ratio, calculated as 
sales over average net operating assets; ACCRi,t is accruals, defined as the difference between net income 
before extraordinary items and cash from operations divided by sales; ∆SALESi,t is  percentage change in sales; 
NEG_∆SALESi,t  is percentage change in sales if it is less than 0, and 0 otherwise.  
40
  This is obtained from I/B/E/S.  
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reclassifying core expenses as non-recurring items. The results for this logit regression are 
presented in Table 3.6 column (2). It shows that firms do not use classification shifting to 
remain within interest coverage covenant limits and this behaviour does not change 
following SEOs. This is perhaps because classification shifting does not have cash flow 
implications and thus firms may not employ it to avoid EBITDA-based interest coverage 
covenant.  
3.5.2 SEO firms with syndicated loans  
Firms that conduct SEOs may also take a syndicate loan by entering a new debt 
contract. On the one hand, syndicated borrowers that enter a new debt contract may increase 
the use of earnings management to avoid covenant violations in the post-lending period. For 
instance, suppose a firm with an interest coverage debt covenant takes a new syndicated 
loan. The interest expenses of this firm are likely to increase after the new loan and, thus, to 
worsen its interest coverage ratio. This would increase the demand for earnings management 
to remain within interest coverage covenant limits. On the other hand, although taking new 
syndicated loans increases firms’ leverage ratio, it does not follow that their financial ratio 
covenants deteriorate leading them to increase earnings management. This is because 
syndicated loans are mainly used by large and healthy firms that also are more likely to 
employ the new funds efficiently. Therefore, my main results may be affected by SEO firms 
with syndicated loans. 
Using the Dealscan database I find 87 firms in the SEO sample also take new syndicated 
loans. To check the robustness of the main findings, I rerun regression (5) after excluding 
SEO firms with syndicated loans. The results are reported in Table 3.7.  
                                                 [Table 3.7 around here] 
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 As can be seen, the findings are consistent with the main results. This suggests that the 
exclusion of SEO firms with syndicated loans does not alter the effect of SEOs on the debt 
covenant hypothesis.   
3.5.3 Alternative proxy for covenant violation 
Christensen et al. (2009) highlight the lack of public covenant data in the UK and 
therefore they use the interest coverage ratio itself for the likelihood and costs of covenant 
violation. This, however, is less likely to test directly the effect of SEOs on the debt 
covenant hypothesis. Thus, I estimate a slack proxy for the interest coverage covenant in my 
main analysis to examine the direct effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis. As I do 
not use actual threshold values, my interest coverage slack proxy may be noisy. I, therefore, 
also employ interest coverage ratio itself to check the robustness of the main results. To do 
so, I replace interest coverage slack proxy (IC_PROXY) with interest coverage ratio (IC) in 
regression (5) and rerun it. The results are presented in Table 3.8.  
                                                [Table 3.8 around here] 
The table shows that the coefficient on IC×SEO×POST interaction variable is 
significantly positive. The implication is that the use of RAM to avoid the possibility of 
interest coverage covenant violations decreases following SEOs. This is because the interest 
coverage ratio is inversely related to the likelihood of covenant violation. Overall, the main 
results are robust to the alternative proxy for covenant violation.   
3.5.4 The effect of syndicated lending on the debt covenant hypothesis  
Firms can also obtain additional funds by raising syndicated loans. Recent studies 
analyse whether firms window dress their accounting numbers around syndicated lending. 
El-Mahdy and Cheng (2014) find that earnings are manipulated around a syndicated loan 
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origination. Firms entering a new debt contract by taking syndicated loans increase their 
overall debt level. The existing research examines the relationship between earnings 
management and debt level and document inconclusive results. For example, Ghosh and 
Moon (2010) find a positive relationship while Ahn and Choi (2009) a negative association. 
Although taking new syndicated loans increases firms’ leverage ratio, it does not follow that 
their financial ratio covenants deteriorate leading them to increase earnings management. 
This is because syndicated loans are mainly originated by large and healthy firms that also 
are more likely to employ the new funds efficiently. As such, there is no evidence that 
entering a new debt contract with covenants via syndicated loans moves their financial ratios 
closer to their threshold levels and thus, increases the demand for earnings management. 
Thus I also tests the effect of additional funds raised via syndicated loans on the debt 
covenant hypothesis. To do so, I run regression (5) for syndicated borrowers and matched 
non-syndicated borrowers. As can be seen in Table 3.9, the use of RAM to avoid interest 
coverage covenant violations does not change following syndicated lending.  
                                                 [Table 3.9 around here] 
3.5.5 Non-frequent issuers  
Some firms may make SEOs frequently and they may have different earnings 
management policy. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) state that firms that raise external 
capital frequently are less likely to manage earnings because they want to have a positive 
reputation in the market so that to conduct subsequent offerings successfully. Hence, such 
firms may decrease or not to do manipulations to avoid covenant violations in the post-issue 
period. To check the robustness of the main findings, frequent issuers are excluded from the 
sample.
41
 Those that make more than one SEO in a two-year period are defined as frequent 
                                                          
41
  36 frequent issuers are found in the SEO sample.  
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issuers following Shivakumar (2000). Regression (5) is re-run after the exclusion of frequent 
issuers and the findings are reported in Table 3.10. The results are consistent with the overall 
conclusion of my main findings.  
                                                        [Table 3.10 around here] 
3.6 Conclusions  
This study examines the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis using a sample 
of UK firms for the years 2005-2013. Specifically, it tests whether SEO firms’ use of real 
activities manipulation to remain within interest coverage covenant limits is different in the 
post-issue period relative to the pre-issue period. Using a difference in differences design, it 
finds that SEO firms engage less in real activities manipulation to avoid the possibility of 
interest coverage covenant violations in the post-issue period relative to the pre-issue period. 
The results show that the decrease in the use of RAM in the post SEO period to avoid the 
likelihood of breaching interest coverage covenant is more pervasive among SEO firms with 
low market to book ratios or high financial leverage. This suggests that firms use at least 
some of their SEO proceeds to reduce their debt and this improves their interest coverage 
covenant. Consequently, the results suggest that SEOs have a strong effect on the debt 
covenant hypothesis.  
Additional analysis also tests the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis using 
accruals management and classification shifting measures of earnings management. I find 
that firms do not engage in these earnings management methods to avoid the possibility of 
interest coverage covenant violations and this behaviour does not change following SEOs. 
Lastly, I find that the main results are robust to the exclusion of SEO firms with syndicated 





                                                           Table 3.1  
                                                     Descriptive statistics 
  Panel A: SEO and non-SEO firms during the whole sample period 
 
 SEO firms    Non-SEO firms     
  Variables   N Mean Median           N Mean    Median   Diff. in 
   Mean 
  Diff. in 
  median 
A_RAMi,t 846 0.031 0.045 690 -0.025     0.010        
*** 
      
*** 
A_PRODi,t 846 0.016 0.026 690 -0.005     0.016        
** 
      
* 
A_DISXi,t 846 0.008 0.026 690 -0.013     0.006        
** 
      
** 
A_CFOi,t 846 0.006 0.007 690 -0.007     -0.001        
*** 
      
*** 
IC_PROXYi,t-1 846 5.349 1.978 690 7.466     3.231        
*** 
      
*** 
MVi,t  846 4.891 4.922 690 4.907     5.048   
Z_SCOREi,t 846 2.595 2.678 690 3.901     3.668 
           *** 
      
*** 
CAPEXi,t 846 0.037 0.023 690 0.036     0.024   
GROWTHi,t 846 0.077 0.056 690 0.061     0.042   
LEVi,t 846 0.257 0.233 690 0.213     0.195        
*** 
      
*** 
CLi,t  846 0.308 0.270 690 0.348     0.323        
*** 
      
*** 
MTBi,t 846 1.757 1.188 690 2.215     1.452        
** 
      
*** 
     Notes               
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of 
production costs, A_DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of 
cash flows from operations, IC_PROXYi,t-1 is the interest coverage covenant slack proxy, MVi,t is market 
value, Z_SCOREi,t  is the Taffler Z-score, CAPEXi,t is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, 
GROWTHi,t is the percentage change in sales, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, CLi,t is the ratio of current 
liabilities to total assets, MTBi,t is the market to book ratio. 
      
***/**/* 















     Panel B: SEO and non-SEO firms in the pre-offer year 
       SEO firms        Non-SEO firms   




A_RAMi,t 232 0.022 0.025  232 -0.011 0.031   
A_PRODi,t 232 0.017 0.018  232 0.003 0.031   
A_DISXi,t 232 -0.004 0.011  232 -0.010 0.009   
A_CFOi,t 232 0.008 0.013  232 -0.003 0.001 
* * 
IC_PROXYi,t-1 232 4.771 1.739  232 7.769 3.350 
*** *** 
MVi,t 232 4.461 4.387  232 4.731 4.863   
Z_SCOREi,t 232 1.161 2.026  232 4.165 3.908 
*** *** 
CAPEXi,t 232 0.040 0.026  232 0.035 0.022   
GROWTHi,t 232 0.092 0.081  232 0.078 0.057   
LEVi,t 232 0.271 0.242  232 0.205 0.186 
*** *** 
CLi,t 232 0.332 0.291  232 0.340 0.319   
MTBi,t 232 1.696 1.158  232 1.747 1.392   
Notes 
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of 
production costs, A_DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, A_CFOi,t is abnormal 
levels of cash flows from operations, IC_PROXYi,t-1 is the interest coverage covenant slack proxy, 
MVi,t is market value, Z_SCOREi,t  is the Taffler Z-score, CAPEXi,t is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets, GROWTHi,t is the percentage change in sales, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, 
CLi,t is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets, MTBi,t is the market to book ratio. 
***/**/* 


















                                                             Table 3.2  
                                                       Univariate analysis 
                    Panel A: Univariate analysis for SEO firms  
Year   N    LEVi,t 
 Median 
      CAPEXi,t    
      Median                   
   CASHi,t    
  Median 
IC_PROXYi,t-1  
   Median  
 -1 232    0.24           0.03      0.05       1.74 
  0 240    0.24           0.02      0.06 
      
  1.90 
  1 214    0.21           0.02      0.05 
         
1.91 
  2 155    0.21           0.02      0.05 
         
2.05 
  3 116    0.21           0.02      0.05        2.34 
 
                   Panel B: Univariate analysis for non-SEO firms 
Year   N    LEVi,t 
 Median 
      CAPEXi,t    
      Median                   
   CASHi,t    
  Median 
IC_PROXYi,t-1  
   Median  
 -1 232    0.19           0.02      0.06        3.35 
  0 192    0.18           0.02      0.07 
      
  3.80 
  1 131    0.19           0.02      0.07 
         
3.80 
  2 94    0.19           0.03      0.07 
         
3.80 
  3 63    0.17           0.03      0.07        3.65 
                  Notes  
LEVi,t is leverage ratio, CAPEXi,t is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, 
CASHi,t is cash scaled by total assets, and IC_PROXYi,t-1 is the interest coverage 

















                                                     Table 3.3 
                                    The effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables  A_RAMi,t A_PRODi,t A_DISXi,t A_CFOi,t 
     
IC_PROXYi,t-1 -0.0039 -0.0020* -0.0015* -0.0004 
 (-1.841) (-1.991) (-1.986) (-1.154) 
SEOi,t 0.0465** 0.0144 0.0270** 0.0051* 
 (2.780) (1.423) (3.200) (1.970) 
POSTi,t -0.0380 -0.0198 -0.0230* 0.0049 
 (-1.639) (-1.559) (-2.129) (0.943) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*SEOi,t 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.326) (0.801) (-0.174) (0.276) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*POSTi,t -0.0018 -0.0010* -0.0005 -0.0002 
 (-1.389) (-1.962) (-0.876) (-0.751) 
SEOi,t*POSTi,t -0.0073 -0.0082 0.0003 0.0006 
 (-0.413) (-0.582) (0.027) (0.135) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*SEOi,t*POSTi,t 0.0043** 0.0021** 0.0021* 0.0001 
 (2.701) (2.746) (2.040) (0.238) 
MVi,t 0.0178*** 0.0080*** 0.0127*** -0.0029*** 
 (6.875) (5.521) (8.724) (-4.302) 
Z_SCOREi,t -0.0054*** -0.0036*** 0.0005 -0.0024*** 
 (-5.538) (-8.677) (0.821) (-11.602) 
CAPEXi,t -1.3830*** -0.7542*** -0.1903** -0.4385*** 
 (-7.683) (-6.744) (-2.754) (-9.682) 
GROWTHi,t -0.1049*** 0.0146 -0.1323*** 0.0128 
 (-4.132) (1.009) (-5.953) (1.357) 
LEVi,t -0.1815* -0.1046* -0.0068 -0.0701*** 
 (-2.291) (-2.414) (-0.167) (-5.755) 
CLi,t -0.0197 -0.0085 0.0554 -0.0665*** 
 (-0.273) (-0.220) (1.771) (-6.488) 
MTBi,t -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0000 -0.0006 
 (-0.819) (-0.841) (-0.000) (-1.449) 
ISSUEi,t -0.0140 -0.0048 -0.0179 0.0087** 
 (-0.449) (-0.268) (-1.262) (2.761) 
Constant 0.1664* 0.0925** -0.0269 0.1009*** 
 (2.442) (2.929) (-0.702) (8.094) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.060 0.060 0.171 
Notes   
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. A_RAMi,t is aggregated 
measure of real activities manipulation, A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of production costs, A_DISXi,t is 
abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, 
IC_PROXYi,t-1 is the interest coverage covenant slack proxy, SEOi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 for SEO firms and 0 otherwise,  POSTi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for both SEO and non-
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SEO firms in the post-issue years and 0 otherwise, MVi,t is market value, Z_SCOREi,t  is the Taffler Z-
score, CAPEXi,t is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, GROWTHi,t is the percentage change 
in sales, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, CLi,t is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. MTBi,t is the market 
to book ratio, and ISSUEi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to1 in the SEO year and 0 otherwise 
   
***/**/* 






































                                                      Table 3.4 
                                    SEO firms with low and high market to book ratios   
 (1) 
Low market to book 
(2) 
High market to book 
Variables  A_RAMi,t A_RAMi,t 
   
IC_PROXYi,t-1 -0.0020 -0.0040 
 (-0.702) (-1.459) 
SEOi,t 0.1021** -0.0250 
 (3.050) (-0.943) 
POSTi,t 0.0048 -0.0644 
 (0.137) (-1.872) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*SEOi,t -0.0018 0.0012 
 (-0.713) (0.460) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*POSTi,t -0.0140** 0.0040 
 (-3.576) (1.429) 
SEOi,t*POSTi,t -0.1346*** 0.1161** 
 (-4.084) (2.810) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*SEOi,t*POSTi,t 0.0168*** -0.0012 
 (3.651) (-0.448) 
MVi,t 0.0110** 0.0401*** 
 (3.270) (6.662) 
Z_SCOREi,t -0.0014 -0.0102*** 
 (-1.139) (-6.143) 
CAPEXi,t -1.3972*** -1.2388*** 
 (-4.838) (-5.350) 
GROWTHi,t -0.0554** -0.1802*** 
 (-3.151) (-5.948) 
LEVi,t -0.4034** 0.0839 
 (-3.419) (0.854) 
CLi,t 0.1638 -0.0652 
 (1.519) (-0.628) 
MTBi,t 0.0003 -0.0071** 
 (0.186) (-3.367) 
ISSUEi,t -0.0344 0.0043 
 (-0.991) (0.071) 
Constant 0.2101 -0.0017 
 (1.712) (-0.019) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes 
Observations 862 674 
Adjusted R-squared 0.081 0.170 
Notes    
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, IC_PROXYi,t-1 is the 
interest coverage covenant slack proxy, SEOi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
for SEO firms and 0 otherwise,  POSTi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for 
both SEO and non-SEO firms in the post-issue years and 0 otherwise, MVi,t is 
market value, Z_SCOREi,t  is the Taffler Z-score, CAPEXi,t is the ratio of capital 
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expenditures to total assets, GROWTHi,t is the percentage change in sales, LEVi,t is 
leverage ratio, CLi,t is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. MTBi,t is the 
market to book ratio, and ISSUEi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to1 in the SEO 
year and 0 otherwise 
                 
***/**/* 



























                                                    Table 3.5 





Variables  A_RAMi,t A_RAMi,t 
   
IC_PROXYi,t-1 -0.0030 -0.0048* 
 (-0.938) (-2.146) 
SEOi,t 0.0693** 0.0408 
 (2.653) (1.837) 
POSTi,t 0.0186 -0.0667 
 (0.429) (-1.797) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*SEOi,t -0.0050 0.0017 
 (-1.318) (0.783) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*POSTi,t -0.0185*** 0.0035 
 (-5.012) (1.428) 
SEOi,t*POSTi,t -0.0983* 0.0569* 
 (-2.251) (1.985) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*SEOi,t*POSTi,t 0.0197* -0.0013 
 (2.237) (-0.624) 
MVi,t 0.0281*** 0.0147* 
 (9.377) (2.389) 
Z_SCOREi,t -0.0077*** -0.0013 
 (-8.710) (-0.667) 
CAPEXi,t -1.3201*** -1.4005*** 
 (-4.742) (-3.734) 
GROWTHi,t -0.1512*** -0.0933 
 (-3.902) (-1.680) 
LEVi,t -0.4014** -0.2505** 
 (-3.118) (-2.739) 
CLi,t -0.1182 0.2257** 
 (-1.120) (3.270) 
MTBi,t 0.0029* -0.0316** 
 (2.029) (-2.458) 
ISSUEi,t 0.0238 -0.0249 
 (0.561) (-1.111) 
Constant 0.2596** 0.1366* 
 (2.916) (2.364) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes 
Observations 734 802 
Adjusted R-squared 0.153 0.141 
                   Notes    
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, IC_PROXYi,t-1 is 
the interest coverage covenant slack proxy, SEOi,t is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 for SEO firms and 0 otherwise,  POSTi,t is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 for both SEO and non-SEO firms in the post-issue years and 0 
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otherwise, MVi,t is market value, Z_SCOREi,t  is the Taffler Z-score, CAPEXi,t is 
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, GROWTHi,t is the percentage 
change in sales, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, CLi,t is the ratio of current liabilities to 
total assets. MTBi,t is the market to book ratio, and ISSUEi,t is a dummy variable 
that is equal to1 in the SEO year and 0 otherwise 
                        
***/**/* 
indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed). 


































                                                  Table 3.6 
                                       Accruals management and classification shifting  
      (1)  (2) 
Variables                                  A_WCAi,t   CSi,t 
   
IC_PROXYi,t-1 -0.0003 0.0082 
 (-0.717) (1.058) 
SEOi,t 0.0110 -0.0399 
 (1.231) (-0.362) 
POSTi,t 0.0199** 0.0873 
 (2.592) (0.398) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*SEOi,t -0.0002 0.0229 
 (-0.453) (1.591) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*POSTi,t -0.0001 -0.0054 
 (-0.189) (-0.577) 
SEOi,t*POSTi,t -0.0174* 0.2237 
 (-2.288) (1.309) 
IC_PROXYi,t-1*SEOi,t*POSTi,t 0.0002 -0.0156 
 (0.424) (-1.270) 
MVi,t -0.0047** 0.1592*** 
 (-2.649) (6.743) 
Z_SCOREi,t 0.0013** -0.0509*** 
 (3.501) (-7.488) 
CAPEXi,t -0.2460** -1.3357** 
 (-3.289) (-2.223) 
GROWTHi,t -0.0193 -0.4399* 
 (-1.794) (-1.819) 
LEVi,t -0.0428 0.5005 
 (-1.530) (1.178) 
CLi,t -0.1382*** -1.8337*** 
 (-5.972) (-3.136) 
MTBi,t 0.0009 -0.0217 
 (0.914) (-1.521) 
ISSUEi,t -0.0020 -0.1328 
 (-0.220) (-1.003) 
Constant 0.0822** -0.8373* 
 (3.518) (-1.898) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes 
Observations 1,536  1,529 
Adjusted R-squared 0.050                 Pseudo R-squared                  0.051 
           Notes   
t- statistics and z-statistics  (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
A_WCAi,t is abnormal working capital accruals, CSi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
for firms have positive unexpected core earnings and higher I/B/E/S earnings than net 
income per share and 0 otherwise, IC_PROXYi,t-1 is the interest coverage covenant slack 
proxy, SEOi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for SEO firms and 0 otherwise,  POSTi,t 
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for both SEO and non-SEO firms in the post-issue 
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years and 0 otherwise, MVi,t is market value, Z_SCOREi,t  is the Taffler Z-score, CAPEXi,t is 
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, GROWTHi,t is the percentage change in sales, 
LEVi,t is leverage ratio, CLi,t is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. MTBi,t is the 
market to book ratio, and ISSUEi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to1 in the SEO year and 
0 otherwise. 
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                                                    Table 3.7 
                            The effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis  
                                              excluding syndicated borrowers  


































Industry dummies  Yes 
Observations 1,050 
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 
                           Notes  
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered 
by year. A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities 
manipulation, IC_PROXYi,t-1 is the interest coverage covenant slack 
proxy, SEOi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for SEO firms and 
0 otherwise,  POSTi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for both 
SEO and non-SEO firms in the post-issue years and 0 otherwise, MVi,t 
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is market value, Z_SCOREi,t  is the Taffler Z-score, CAPEXi,t is the 
ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, GROWTHi,t is the 
percentage change in sales, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, CLi,t is the ratio of 
current liabilities to total assets. MTBi,t is the market to book ratio, and 
ISSUEi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to1 in the SEO year and 0 
otherwise 
                             
***/**/* 

























                                                 Table 3.8 
                                      Alternative proxy for covenant violation  



































Industry dummies  Yes 
Observations 1,536 
Adjusted R-squared 0.074 
                         Notes  
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by 
year. A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, 
ICi,t is the interest coverage ratio, SEOi,t is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 for SEO firms and 0 otherwise,  POSTi,t is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 for both SEO and non-SEO firms in the post-issue 
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years and 0 otherwise, MVi,t is market value, Z_SCOREi,t  is the Taffler 
Z-score, CAPEXi,t is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, 
GROWTHi,t is the percentage change in sales, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, 
CLi,t is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. MTBi,t is the market 
to book ratio, and ISSUEi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to1 in the 
SEO year and 0 otherwise 
                          
***/**/* 


























                                                             Table 3.9 
                  The effect of syndicated lending on the debt covenant hypothesis  


































Industry dummies  Yes 
Observations 1,361 
Adjusted R-squared 0.077 
                      Notes  
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. 
A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, IC_PROXYi,t-1 
is the interest coverage covenant slack proxy, SYNDi,t is a dummy variable that 
is equal to 1 for syndicated borrowers and 0 otherwise,  POSTi,t is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 for both syndicated and non-syndicated borrowers in 
the post-issue years and 0 otherwise, MVi,t is market value, Z_SCOREi,t  is the 
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Taffler Z-score, CAPEXi,t is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, 
GROWTHi,t is the percentage change in sales, LEVi,t is leverage ratio, CLi,t is the 
ratio of current liabilities to total assets. MTBi,t is the market to book ratio, and 
LOANi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to1 in the syndicated lending year 
and 0 otherwise 
                                    ***/**/* 



























                                                     Table 3.10 
                                                           Non-frequent issuers 



































Industry dummies Yes 
Observations 1,350 
Adjusted R-squared 0.057 
                               Notes   
   t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by 
year. A_RAMi,t is aggregated measure of real activities manipulation, 
IC_PROXYi,t-1 is the interest coverage covenant slack proxy, SEOi,t is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 for SEO firms and 0 otherwise,  POSTi,t 
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for both SEO and non-SEO firms in 
the post-issue years and 0 otherwise, MVi,t is market value, Z_SCOREi,t  is 
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the Taffler Z-score, CAPEXi,t is the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets, GROWTHi,t is the percentage change in sales, LEVi,t is leverage 
ratio, CLi,t is the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. MTBi,t is the 
market to book ratio, and ISSUEi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to1 in 
the SEO year and 0 otherwise 
                             
***/**/* 
































4.1 Introduction  
There is a huge literature on earnings management under which accounting information 
can be manipulated in various ways to mask a firms’ true economic performance. One 
recently established form of earnings management is classification shifting. This is based on 
the misclassification of items within the income statement but does not change net income. 
This study investigates the misclassification of revenue items. There are at least two 
theoretical motivations why firms may engage in this activity. One is based on investor 
perception of accounting information items. Investors appear to weight individual line items 
in the income statement differently (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Davis, 2002). In particular, 




The other motivation is catering theory originally developed in the context of dividends 
(Baker & Wurgler, 2004).
43
 Since then, the concept of catering has become one of the 
                                                          
42
 I use the nomenclature ‘core revenues’ throughout the paper, when referring to operating revenues (sales) 
subtotal that generally comes as a first line item on the face of the income statement.  
43
 In this context, managers were viewed as catering to investors by paying dividends when investors put a 
stock price premium on dividends, and by not paying when investors prefer nonpayers. 
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building blocks of behavioural corporate finance and has been generalized to the idea that 
managers take non-value maximising actions (e.g. earnings management) to cater for 
investors to boost their short run share price (Baker & Wurgler, 2012 ). In this context, 
misclassification of revenue items can be employed to boost core revenues and, relatedly, 
core earnings. These can have a positive short run impact on the share price since analysts 
use them as an input to make price forecasts using the residual income model.  
McVay (2006) was the first to find empirical evidence for classification shifting in the 
context of expense items. She found that US firms engage in classification shifting to 
manipulate core earnings by shifting core expenses from cost of goods sold and selling, 
general and administrative expenses to income-decreasing special items. Subsequent studies 
have also produced empirical evidence that UK firms (Athanasakou, Strong, & Walker, 
2011; Zalata & Roberts, 2015) as well as East Asian firms (Haw, Ho, & Li, 2011) 
misclassify core expenses as non-recurring expenses.  
The above studies examined the understatement of core expenses, which generally 
appear in the income statement after core revenues, for increasing core earnings. Firms, 
however, can also overstate core earnings by shifting other revenues to core revenues.
44
 
Indeed, McVay (2006) observed that firms may shift other revenues up the income statement 
but she left this type of classification shifting for future research. Concern about the 
reclassification has been shown by organizations such as the Securities and Exchange 
                                                          
44
 Oher revenues are those that firms achieve from non-operating activities (e.g. rental income, investment 
income) including those from non-recurring items (e.g. gains on disposals of assets). Firms are likely to shift 
them to core revenues as they are less valuable to investors (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Davis, 2002) and 
analysts (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2002) relative to core revenues. I calculate other revenues as the difference 
between net income pre-tax (adjusted for interest payments) and core earnings where the latter is defined as 
core revenues minus cost of goods sold minus selling, general and administrative expenses. This difference 
gives total non-operating items which capture both non-operating revenues and expenses (excluding interest 
payments) and throughout the paper I use the nomenclature ‘other revenues’ which refer to total non-operating 
items. The advantage of using total non-operating items is that they allow having a non-zero number in the 
dataset in the case when firms successfully shift all their other revenues to core revenues. Having zero other 
revenues in the dataset is likely to give biased results for examining revenue shifting. I am very thankful to an 
anonymous reviewer for the valuable comment on this issue.  
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Commission (SEC).  They were particularly worried about the misclassification of income 
statement line items such as improperly showing investment income or gains on disposals of 
assets as product or service revenue (SEC, 2000). As an anecdotal example, a global 
electrical engineering company ABB that has branches in countries such as the USA and the 
UK was able continually to misclassify other revenues from the sale of fixed assets as core 
revenues (Jones, 2011).  
  Firms may have more incentives to inflate core revenues than to understate core 
expenses through misclassification as an increase in core revenues is more valued by 
investors than a decrease in core expenses (Ertimur, Livnat, & Martikainen, 2003; Marguardt 
& Wiedman, 2004). Furthermore, analysts forecast sales, core earnings, and cash flows but 
not core expenses. Inflating core revenues via classification shifting enables managers to 
meet both analyst’s sales and core earnings forecasts while understating core expenses 
through shifting they can only meet analyst’s core earnings forecasts. Kinney and Trezevant 
(1997) and Weiss (2001) document that firms are more likely to decrease non-recurring 
gains to influence investors’ perceptions by providing a signal that their earnings are mainly 
based on recurring operations. These firms may reduce transitory gains by shifting them to 
core revenues. Existing studies find that core revenues are overestimated via real earnings 
management by offering price discounts or more lenient credit terms (e.g. Gunny, 2010; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). This study complements the previous work and can help market 
participants by alerting them to potential earnings management using revenue shifting for 
inflating core revenues when a firm does not disclose the components of core revenues and 
other revenues in its annual report. These factors suggest the importance of examining 
revenue reclassification in addition to expense misclassification.    
The first contribution of this paper is that it extends the classification shifting literature 
by being the first to examine revenue reclassification. Specifically, it investigates and tests 
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whether firms shift other revenues to core revenues.
45
 This is tested in the context of the UK 
because the latter provides an interesting laboratory for this test for two reasons. On the one 
hand, UK firms have followed International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) since 
2005. As more countries adopt IFRS, considerable effort has focused on the extent to which 
it influences financial reporting (Christensen, Lee, Walker, & Zeng, 2015; Iatridis, 2012) in 
the major economies.
46
 Thus, focusing on one of the latter enables us to determine whether 
IFRS allows firms to engage in revenue reclassification. On the other hand, the UK enjoyed 
one of the highest quality sets of national accounting standards (UK GAAP) prior to IFRS 
(Horton & Serafeim, 2010). This allows us to ascertain what opportunities (if any) IFRS 
adoption provided in relation to revenue shifting for UK firms.  
Firms can use different items in other revenues to employ revenue shifting depending on 
the accounting standards in operation. In other words, the scope for firms’ revenue 
reclassification practices depends on the flexibility or strictness of the accounting standards 
with regard to income statement items. Therefore, the second contribution of this paper is to 
examine revenue reclassification in the UK setting both under UK GAAP and IFRS to 
determine which of these standards offer broader scope for this earnings management 
method. 
UK firms followed Financial Reporting Standard No. 3: Reporting Financial 
Performance (FRS 3) to prepare their income statement under UK GAAP from 1993 till 
IFRS adoption. The main intention of introducing this standard was to improve performance 
assessments and to constrain earnings manipulations. FRS 3 required firms to disclose 
                                                          
45 I do not assume that all firms do revenue shifting as the latter may also occur naturally without any 
accounting manipulation. For instance, a firm may show rental income as core revenues due to the fact that 
such classification fits its business model. This is because standards such as IFRS give firms flexibility to do 
their own judgements regarding classification.  
46
 In addition to investigating if revenue reclassification also occurs in other countries, it would be useful to 
determine the extent to which a particular country’s GAAP allowed reclassification compared to when IFRS 
was introduced.  
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operating profit and core revenues separately on the face of the income statement but they 
did not define them. Thus, how they are defined is subject to managerial judgement 
suggesting that firms may classify non-operating revenues such as rental income, ancillary 
revenues, and investment income as core revenues. FRS 3 also required firms to distinguish 
operating and non-operating exceptional items and show for the latter certain components 
separately on the face of the income statement. Although discontinued operations should be 
shown in the income statement under UK GAAP, their restrictive definition creates room for 
managerial discretion. Choi, Lin, Walker, and Young (2007) document that FRS 3 improves 
transparency with regard to non-operating exceptional items but still offers some latitude for 
managements’ opportunistic discretion with regard to operating exceptional items and 
discontinued operations. This implies that firms may use other revenues from discontinued 
operations and from operating exceptional items (e.g. foreign currency gains) for revenue 
shifting under UK GAAP.  
IFRS requires firms to disclose revenues but not operating profit. There is a specific 
standard on revenue, IAS 18, which has a broader scope thus allowing managers more 
opportunity to determine core revenues (Nobes, 2012). Although IFRS does not require 
firms to show operating profit on the face of the income statement, it allows firms to present 
such a subtotal without providing them with guidance. The implication is that firms under 
IFRS may use non-operating revenues such as investment income and rental income for 
revenue reclassification just like under UK GAAP. Furthermore, IFRS (IAS 1) has very 
weak disclosure requirements and guidance for non-recurring items compared to UK GAAP 
(Zalata & Roberts, 2015). IAS 1 only states that an entity should disclose non-recurring 
items either on the face of the income statement or in the notes when such items are material. 
This means that IFRS allows firms to classify transitory gains such as income from the sale 
of the assets, investments, and changes in exchange rate as core revenues without disclosing 
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them. I, thus, expect that IFRS broadens the scope for revenue reclassification because of the 
more flexible requirements for non-recurring items.   
I develop an expectation model for decomposing core revenues into expected and 
unexpected components similar to McVay’s (2006) core earnings model. Drawing on 13,915 
firm-year observations from all UK listed firms for the 1995-2014 period, I find that 
unexpected core revenues increase as other revenues decrease. This provides evidence that 
firms shift other revenues to core revenues, consistent with revenue reclassification. The 
results show that firms engage in such activities to a greater extent after mandatory IFRS 
adoption suggesting that the latter offers more latitude for these practices. This supports 
Zalata and Roberts (2015) who document that IFRS allows firms to have more managerial 
discretion on classification of non-recurring items.  
The final contribution of this paper is that it examines whether firms with strong 
incentives use revenue reclassification to a greater extent. Existing studies document firms 
that make seasoned equity offerings (hereafter SEOs), are in financial distress, make 
acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and meet certain earnings benchmarks 
have high incentives to engage in earnings management. Marguardt and Wiedman (2004) 
find that firms that plan to make equity offerings inflate sales by employing accruals 
management. A similar result is found by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) with regard to using 
real earnings management to overestimate sales in the year of the SEOs. Fan and Liu (2015) 
find that firms shift core expenses both from the cost of goods sold and selling, general and 
administrative expenses to income-decreasing special items for meeting/beating zero core 
earnings and prior period core earnings. As revenue reclassification is likely to inflate core 
revenues and core earnings, I expect that firms conducting SEOs, firms in financial distress, 
firms with acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and firms reporting small core 
earnings or small increases in core earnings employ revenue reclassification to a greater 
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degree. My results are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that revenue 
reclassification is more pervasive among firms with strong incentives.  
This study proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the main 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and discusses the data and sample. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 shows robustness check. Section 6 
concludes. 
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development  
4.2.1 Literature review 
Existing studies have examined three earnings management tools (e.g. Jones, 1991; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). These are accruals management, real earnings management, and 
classification shifting.
47
 The latter has been the main focus of several recent papers and 
McVay (2006), using a sample of US firms, was first to analyze the possibility of shifting 
items intentionally within the income statement. The main advantage of classification 
shifting is that it does not change bottom line earnings and does not affect long term firm 
value unlike discretionary accruals and RAM. This may limit the scrutiny of auditors and 
regulators. McVay found that firms engage in classification shifting to increase core earnings 
by determining the relationship between core earnings and income-decreasing special items. 
She explains her results as being due to the shifting of core expenses from the cost of goods 
sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses to income-decreasing special items. 
However, she does not test expense shifting directly and core earnings may also go up due to 
misclassifying transitory gains as core revenues. This suggests that her results must be 
tempered by the potential for manipulation using revenue shifting rather than expense 
shifting.  
                                                          
47
 Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Kothari (2001) conduct studies that review discretionary accruals literature 
while RAM literature can be found in Xu, Taylor, and Dugan (2007).   
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Fan et al. (2010) also find that US firms use classification shifting and that managers 
shift core expenses to income-decreasing special items to a greater extent when they cannot 
manipulate earnings through accruals. Although they do not test expense shifting directly, 
their results are less biased as they use quarterly data and control for the possibility of 
inflating core earnings via accruals management. There may be other non-operating items in 
addition to special items that firms can use to increase core earnings. Barua et al. (2010) 
address this issue by examining whether firms employ classification shifting using 
discontinued operations. They document that US firms shift core expenses to income-
decreasing discontinued operations to overestimate core earnings.   
Several studies test whether firms in other developed economies or in emerging 
economies use classification shifting. These papers can help to determine the specific 
requirements of standards that should be in place to deter the misclassification of income 
statement line items. Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker (2009) examine UK firms’ 
classification shifting in the UK GAAP period. They find that only large firms in their 
sample shift small core expenses to operating exceptional or to other non-recurring items to 
overstate core earnings to meet earnings targets. Zalata and Roberts (2015) test expense 
shifting for UK firms under IFRS and their results suggest that IFRS offers greater latitude 
for misclassification than UK GAAP. They also find that firms having independent directors, 
directors with long tenure, audit committees that meet frequently, and have more financial 
experts appear to be less likely to reclassify core expenses. Haw et al. (2011) document that 
firms in East Asia using different local GAAP regimes shift core expenses to special items 
opportunistically to exaggerate core earnings and misclassification is more pervasive when 
classification shifting enables firms to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. They also 
find that family controlled firms use more misclassification but firms with a Big-4 auditor or 
in countries with a well-functioning legal framework are less likely to employ classification 
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shifting. The implication of the above studies is that relatively rigid accounting standards 
such as UK GAAP or strong corporate governance are likely to reduce the scope for 
classification shifting. Therefore, it would be useful if standard setters improve their 
requirements and guidance regarding key income statement line items to mitigate their 
possible misclassification.  
Research in the area of reclassification was extended by Fan and Liu (2015) who sought 
to determine how and to what extent reclassification occurred through cost of goods sold and 
selling, general, and administrative expenses. In other words, they examine expense shifting 
directly unlike existing relevant studies by regressing core expenses on special items. This 
can help to determine whether indeed an increase in core earnings was due to expense 
shifting as documented by prior classification shifting studies. Their results indicate that 
firms underestimate cost of goods sold via income-decreasing special items to improve their 
gross margin. In contrast, firms shift core expenses both from cost of goods sold and selling, 
general, and administrative expenses to income-decreasing special items for meeting/beating 
zero core earnings, prior period core earnings, and analyst forecasts.  Another important 
contribution of their study is that they also consider the possibility of managing earnings for 
inflating gross margin which has been largely ignored by previous earnings management 
studies. Furthermore, they show that firms employ real earnings management and expense 
reclassification jointly to inflate gross margin and to meet or beat prior period core 
earnings.
48
    
4.2.2 Hypothesis development 
This study extends the classification shifting literature by examining whether firms use 
revenue reclassification to increase core revenues. Firms are likely to have incentives to 
                                                          
48




misclassify other revenues as core revenues in addition to expense shifting for a number of 
reasons. First, revenue reclassification inflates core revenues while expense shifting 
decreases core expenses. An increase in core revenues is likely to be more appealing to 
investors than core expense reductions. Anthony and Ramesh (1992) and Ertimur et al. 
(2003) found that investors value a dollar of core revenues surprises more highly than a 
dollar decrease in core expenses. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Davis (2002) document 
that investors give more value to the core revenues subtotal or those individual line items in 
income statement that are close to it. This suggests that the core revenues item is one of the 
key indicators that investors consider in assessing a firm’s financial performance. Second, 
analysts make sales and core earnings forecasts while they do not make core expenses 
forecasts. The implication is that if firms engage in revenue shifting they can meet both sales 
and core earnings forecasts while expense shifting can help them to meet core earnings 
forecasts only. The other benefit of using revenue shifting is that it allows firms to manage 
earnings when real earnings management and accruals management are costly. For instance, 
firms with higher effective tax rate are likely to use revenue reclassification as the latter 
increases core earnings without tax consequences unlike real earnings management and 
accruals management.
49
 Third, those firms that have transitory gains are likely to reduce 
them to signal that their income is mainly based on core earnings. Such firms can reduce 
their transitory gains by shifting them to core revenues. Kinney and Trezevant (1997) 
document that firms with gains from non-recurring operations tend to report them in 
footnotes rather than on the income statement to shift attention away from the transitory 
nature of these items. Consistent with this, Weiss (2001) found that firms try to decrease 
their transitory gains by recognizing income-decreasing special items. Furthermore, this 
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  However, the use of revenue shifting can be costly in cases such as when firms have higher institutional 
ownership and have longer auditor tenure. This is because the misclassification of revenue items can be 
recognized in such firms.  
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earnings management method may not be subject to extensive scrutiny by auditors. This is 
because the classification of some revenues can be subjective which may limit auditors’ 
ability to challenge managements’ classification. Also, revenue reclassification does not 
change bottom-line income which auditors may perceive as less important and therefore they 
may spend less energy to identify or adjust such misclassification (Nelson, Elliott, & 
Tarpley, 2002). Overall, the above suggests that firms are likely to have incentives to engage 
in revenue reclassification. More formally: 
H1: Firms engage in revenue reclassification.   
Firms can use different items of other revenues to employ revenue shifting depending on 
the accounting standards in operation. In other words, the scope for firms’ revenue 
reclassification practices depends on the flexibility or strictness of accounting standards. I, 
thus, discuss UK GAAP and IFRS to provide examples for the mechanism of revenue 
reclassification and, more importantly, to determine which of these standards are likely to 
offer broader scope for revenue shifting.  
UK firms followed FRS 3 to prepare their income statement under UK GAAP from 
1993 till 2005. The main intention of introducing this standard was to improve performance 
assessments and to constrain earnings manipulations. FRS 3 required firms to disclose 
operating profit and core revenues separately on the face of the income statement but it did 
not define them. Their definitions are subject to managerial judgement suggesting that there 
may be opportunity for management to classify non-operating revenues such as rental 
income, ancillary revenues, and investment income as core revenues.
50
 FRS 3 also required 
that companies should distinguish between operating and non-operating exceptional items. 
UK firms had to show 3 types of non-operating exceptional items: 1) profits or losses on the 
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 Ancillary revenues are generated from the sale of products (services) that are not the main products (services) 
of the company. For example, baggage fees and food or beverage sales at petrol stations are ancillary revenues 
for airline and oil firms, respectively.  
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sale or termination of an operation 2) fundamental reorganization or restructuring costs and 
3) profits or losses on the disposal of fixed assets after operating profit on the face of the 
income statement. The implication is that UK firms had limited or no opportunity to use 
these non-recurring items for classification shifting. Regarding operating exceptional items, 
firms could show them either as footnotes or on the face of the income statement. 
Furthermore, although discontinued operations should be shown in the income statement 
under UK GAAP, the restrictive definition used for discontinued operations creates room for 
managerial discretion. Choi et al. (2007) document that FRS 3 improves transparency with 
regard to non-operating exceptional items but still offers some latitude for managements’ 
opportunistic discretion regarding operating exceptional items and discontinued operations. 
This suggests that non-recurring items such as gains from discontinued operations and 
income from operating exceptional items (e.g. net foreign exchange gains) offer latitude for 
revenue reclassification. Therefore, a further scope for revenue reclassification under UK 
GAAP is that firms may use such types of income-increasing non-recurring items to inflate 
core revenues. 
By contrast IFRS does not require firms to disclose operating profits or to distinguish 
different types of non-recurring items on the face of the income statement and does not list 
the items that should be taken into account when working out core earnings. In other words, 
it does not have particular requirements for core revenues and core expenses which help to 
determine operating profit. However, it allows firms to disclose as many subtotals as they 
wish if they believe such items help users to understand their financial performance. IFRS 
permits companies to determine core revenues and core earnings based on the nature of their 
operations. This in turn is likely to create scope for potential revenue reclassification.  
 Revenue recognition under IFRS, IAS 18 defines those transactions as revenue that 
arises from the ordinary activities of an entity. It captures revenues from the sale of goods, 
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the rendering of services, and the use by others of entity assets giving rise to interest, 
dividends and royalties. The main limitation of this standard is that it has a broad scope as 
the revenue item conventionally comes first in the income statement and mainly covers a 
firm’s trading activities. In this case, interest or dividends are not revenue for non-financial 
firms but are defined as revenue in IAS 18 (Nobes, 2012). Furthermore, IFRS (IAS 1) does 
not require firms to present finance income separately on the face of the income statement 
and allows them to make their own judgments for the classification of such items.
51
 This lack 
of guidance and requirements may allow firms to engage in revenue reclassification by 
classifying dividends or interest income as part of the first income statement line item. A 
further scope for revenue shifting under IFRS is likely to be due to the other income or other 
operating profit items. This is because IFRS does not require firms to disclose other 
operating profit or other income subtotals but allows them to do this without providing 
detailed guidance. For instance Next plc (Annual Report, 2012) shows rental income from 
operating lease as part of core revenues while Morrison Supermarkets (Annual Report, 2013) 
shows it as part of other operating income.  
The requirements for non-recurring items are more flexible and less rigid under IFRS 
than under UK GAAP. IAS 1 merely provides firms with guidance by stating that an entity 
should disclose non-recurring items either on the face of the income statement or in the notes 
when such items are material. Zalata and Roberts (2015) show that the lack guidance for 
non-recurring items under IFRS offers more latitude for classification shifting. The 
implication is that IFRS may encourage firms to classify transitory gains as core revenues 
without disclosing them.
52
 These transitory items could be gains from the sale of assets/ 
investments and the gain/loss arising from a change in exchange rates.  
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 An entity may include finance income in core revenues or in other operating income/other income subtotals 
depending on the view they take.  
52
 Firms, however, may not be able to use gains from discontinued operations under IFRS. This is because 
IFRS 5 (the main relevant standard on discontinued operations under IFRS) provides detailed guidance about 
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Overall, the above discussion suggests that UK GAAP offers some scope for revenue 
reclassification but IFRS offers even greater scope for this earnings management method. 
Therefore, I expect that mandatory IFRS adoption increases the use of revenue 
reclassification. More formally: 
H2: Firms engage in revenue reclassification to a greater extent after mandatory IFRS 
adoption.   
The literature provides evidence that firms such as those conducting SEOs, in financial 
distress, with acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and meeting earnings 
benchmarks have greater incentives to engage in earnings management. Firms engaging in 
SEOs have a strong incentive to overestimate earnings in the issue year to maximize their 
short run share price and thus their SEO proceeds. This incentive is consistent with the 
Baker, Rubak, and Wurgler (2007) catering approach where managers seek to boost their 
firm’s short run price for their own ends. It also links neatly with misvaluation53 approaches 
where overvalued firms use market timing to take advantage of temporary mispricing when 
raising external funds. The empirical evidence for managing earnings at the time of SEOs is 
provided by Marguardt and Wiedman (2004) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) who find that 
firms inflate sales around this corporate event via accruals management and real earnings 
management, respectively. 
Firms in financial distress have strong incentives to manage core earnings especially to 
avoid costly actions or being placed into receivership (Franz, HassabElnaby, & Lobo, 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
the conditions when an asset can be classified as held for sale, the measurement of an asset or disposal group 
and the disclosure and presentation of an asset in the financial statements. In particular, IFRS 5 requires firms 
to disclose revenue, expenses, income tax expense of discontinued operations either in the notes or income 
statement but post-tax profit or loss of discontinued operations on the face of the income statement and cash 
flow statement.  
53
 See Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) for behavioural 




This is more likely to be pervasive among firms in financial distress in the UK where firms 
operate under a debt-friendly bankruptcy code.
54
 Similarly, Botsari and Meeks (2008) find 
that acquirers manage earnings to increase their share price prior to a share for share bid. 
Furthermore, Fan and Liu (2015) find that firms have strong incentives to shift core expenses 
both from the cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses to income-
decreasing special items to meet earnings benchmarks such as zero core earnings and prior 
year’s core earnings and this is consistent with the results of Fan et al. (2010). The main 
motivation for meeting earnings benchmarks is related to market-based benefits. For 
example, Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) document that firms which meet prior year’s 
earnings have higher price-earnings multiples compared to those who do not. Jiang (2008) 
finds that firms which exceed the zero earnings benchmark also have lower costs of debt.  
Based on above, I expect that firms conducting SEOs, firms in financial distress, firms 
with acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and firms reporting small core 
earnings or small increases in core earnings employ revenue reclassification to a greater 
degree. These firms’ revenue shifting practices may be missed by auditors as such 
classification may fit their business model.  More formally: 
H3A: Firms engage in revenue reclassification to a greater extent when they conduct 
SEOs. 
H3B: Firms engage in revenue reclassification to a greater extent when they are in 
financial distress. 
H3C: Firms engage in revenue reclassification to a greater extent when they use their 
shares to pay for acquisitions.  
H3D: Firms engage in revenue reclassification to a greater extent when they report 
small core earnings. 
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 See Acharya, Sundaram, and John (2011) for more details of bankruptcy codes in the UK.  
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H3E: Firms engage in revenue reclassification to a greater extent when they report 
small increases in core earnings. 
4.3 Research design and data 
4.3.1 Measuring revenue reclassification  
This section outlines my methodology to estimate revenue reclassification. I expect that 
core revenues of firms are inflated in the year in which the components of other revenues are 
not disclosed. I model the level of core revenues and anticipate that unexpected core 
revenues (reported core revenues less expected core revenues) in year t increase as other 
revenues in year t decrease if managers use revenue reclassification. Thus, I expect firms that 
engage in revenue reclassification to have a higher than expected level of core revenues in 
year t. 
I develop the following model to estimate the expected level of core revenues:  
𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1












+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡                                                          (1) 
where CRi,t is core revenues for firm i in year t; ATi,t-1 is total assets; TRi,t is trade receivables. 
The independent variables in model (1) are designed to control for factors that are likely 
to affect the expected level of core revenues. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets. 
The latter is used as a deflator following Roychowdhury (2006) and Fan and Liu (2015) who 
develop models for the expected level of core expenses. Similar to the studies that estimate 
earnings management measures, a scaled intercept is included (e.g. Fan & Liu, 2015; Gunny, 
2010; Roychowdhury, 2006).
55
 This helps to avoid a spurious correlation between scaled 
core revenues and scaled trade receivables due to the variation in scaling variable, total 
assets.  Lagged core revenues (CRi,t-1) are included to control for core revenues persistence. 
In other words, previous year’s core revenues are a good proxy to predict the following 
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 The main results do not change if I do not include the scaled intercept.  
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year’s core revenues. Sloan (1996) finds that current accruals are negatively associated with 
future earnings performance. Since my model is concerned with estimating core revenues I 
believe it is more appropriate to use trade receivables rather than total accruals because the 
former is likely to be more directly related to core revenues. Following the argument by 
Sloan (1996) I include lagged trade receivables (TRi,t-1) as they may possibly affect the 
current level of core revenues.
56
 DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994) find that there is 
a positive correlation between extreme performance and accrual levels. This suggests that 
firms with unusually high core revenues are likely to have high trade receivables. I, thus, 
also include current-year trade receivables (TRi,t) in my model. Moreover, a large value for 
trade receivables can also be due to accruals earnings management and so, the inclusion of 




Model (1) is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year to control for 
macroeconomic and industry shocks similar to the other earnings management models (e.g. 
Fan & Liu, 2015; McVay, 2006). Unexpected core revenues are calculated as the difference 
between reported and expected core revenues, where the latter are estimated using the 
coefficients from model (1).  
4.3.2  Regression models 
Hypothesis 1 states that firms reclassify other revenues as core revenues. Since I 
anticipate that unexpected core revenues increase as other revenues decrease if managers use 
revenue reclassification, the former is regressed on the latter along with the control variables 
to test Hypothesis 1. The regression is: 
                                                          
56
 The main results do not alter if I use working capital accruals or total accruals instead of trade receivables in 
model (1). I also tried a model including the change in trade receivables as an independent variable and 
obtained similar results.  
57
 As core revenues can also be inflated via real earnings management (e.g. Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 




   𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼6𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (2) 
where UE_CRi,t is unexpected core revenues for firm i in year t; ORi,t is other revenues, 
defined as net income pre-tax plus interest payments minus core earnings divided by lagged 
total assets. Hypothesis 1 predicts 𝛼1 to be negative in regression (2).  
ROAi,t, LEVi,t, NOAi,t-1, SIZEi,t-1, and CLi,t are added as control variables to the linear 
regression model (2) following the earnings management literature (e.g. Roychowdhury, 
2006). ROAi,t, is return on asset, defined as net income for firm i in year t scaled by lagged 
total assets and is added to control for firm performance. LEVi,t  is leverage ratio, defined as 
the sum of, long term debt and debt in current liabilities (short-term debt) divided by lagged 
total assets. This is included as a control for capital structure. NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets, 
defined as common equity minus cash and short-term investment plus total debt divided by 
lagged total assets. This is added to control for the use of earnings management proxies. 
SIZEi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the lagged total assets and is included to control for firm 
size. CLi,t is ratio of current liabilities excluding short-term debt to total assets and is added 
to control for short-term liabilities.  
Hypothesis 2 states that firms engage in revenue reclassification to a greater extent after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. To test this, I extend regression (2) by adding a dummy variable, 
IFRS, that is equal to one for the years after 2005 and zero otherwise, and its interaction with 
other revenues (OR). Accordingly the regression is: 
     𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛼7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼8𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                (3) 
Hypothesis 2 predicts 𝛼3 to be negative in regression (3).  
To test whether firms with high incentives employ revenue reclassification to a greater 
extent (H3A, H3B, H3C, H3D. and H3E), I extend regression (2) by adding a dummy 
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variable, INSTV, that is equal to one for firms with high incentives  and zero otherwise, and 
its interaction with other revenues (OR). Accordingly the regression is: 
     𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛼7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼8𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                (4) 
where INSTVi,t is defined in five alternatives ways. The first is for firms conducting SEOs, 
(INSTVi,t = SEOi,t). SEOi,t is equal to one for firm-years that are in the top quartile of the 
percentage increase in common stock and zero otherwise.
58
 The second is for firms in 
financial distress (INSTVi,t = DISTRESSi,t). DISTRESSi,t is equal to one for firm-years that 
have negative Z scores and zero otherwise.
59
 The third is for firms with acquisitions financed 
by share for share exchange (INSTVi,t = ACi,t). ACi,t is equal to one in the year before the 
takeover and zero otherwise.
60
 The forth is for firms reporting small core earnings (INSTVi,t = 
MBZ_CEi,t). MBZ_CEi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have core earnings of between 0 
and 0.005, and zero otherwise. The fifth is for firms reporting small increases in core 
earnings (INSTVi,t = MBP_CEi,t). MBP_CEi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have an 
increase in core earnings of between 0 and 0.005, and zero otherwise. I expect 𝛼3 to be 
negative in regression (4).  
Since the above regressions involve panel data, I determine whether there is cross 
sectional or time series dependence to avoid biased standard errors. Following the Petersen 
(2009) methodology, it is concluded that there is cross sectional dependence since the White 
standard errors are not the same as the standard errors clustered by year whereas they are the 
same as the standard errors clustered by firms. Accordingly, standard errors clustered by 
year are used to mitigate this problem.  
                                                          
58
 This dummy variable is defined following Doukakis (2014) which captures firms that make SEOs. I have 
1373 such firms in the sample.    
59
 Z score is calculated using the Taffler (1983) Z score model. According to this model, if a firm has a negative 
Z score, it is likely to be in financial distress.  
60
 Firms that make takeover bids are obtained from the Thomson 1 database.  
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4.3.3 Data and sample 
Data are obtained from Compustat Global for all UK (dead and live) listed firms for the 
period between 1994 and 2014.
61
 The sample period begins in 1994 because UK firms were 
required to follow FRS 3 (UK GAAP) after June 23, 1993 until mandatory IFRS adoption in 
2005. It is required that firm-years have positive core revenues and total assets. Following 
prior studies, I exclude financial and utility firms because the former have a different 
financial reporting environment and the latter have more predictable earnings growth. The 
estimation of the expected core revenues requires two years of lagged data and as a result, 
the data for 1994 is lost.   
Finally, to make sure that I have sufficient data for the estimation of expected core 
revenues, I require at least 6 observations per industry-year following Athanasakou et al. 
(2009). I apply the Global Industry Classification Scheme (GICS) for the classification of 
industries because it gives more accurate empirical results (Bhojraj, Lee, & Oler, 2003; 
Hrazdil, Trottier, & Zhang, 2013; Kile & Philips, 2009). I winsorize all variables at the 1 
percent and 99 percent levels to eliminate the impact of outliers. Consequently, my final 
sample contains 1,925 firms and 13,915 observations.   
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables. The mean (median) of 
unexpected core revenues is 0 (-0.006). 
                                                          [Table 4.1 around here] 
As shown in Table 2, the mean (median) of other revenues is -0.159 (-0.055).This 
indicates that UK firms on average report more expenses than revenues from non-operating 
activities. This may suggest the possibility that firms have used revenue reclassification by 
misclassifying revenues from non-operating activities as core revenues. 
                                                          
61
 Dead firms are included across the test period to avoid survivorship bias. 
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4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Revenue reclassification  
The results for testing revenue reclassification are shown in Table 4.2.
62
  
                                                          [Table 4.2 around here] 
The table indicates a significantly negative association between unexpected core revenues 
and OR at the 1% significance level. This implies that firms engage in revenue 
reclassification by shifting other revenues to core revenues and supports Hypothesis 1. The 
coefficient of OR (α1 = -0.048) is also economically significant showing that the use of 
revenue reclassification is common practice. The results are consistent with the proposition 
that financial statement users value income statement line items differently and give more 
value to the core revenues item or those close to it (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Davis, 2002). 
Overall, the results provide evidence that misclassification not only takes place among 
expense items (Fan & Liu, 2015; McVay, 2006) but also among revenue items.  
4.4.2 IFRS adoption and revenue reclassification   
The results for testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on revenue reclassification 
are presented in Table 4.3. 
                                                          [Table 4.3 around here] 
The table shows a significantly negative association between unexpected core revenues and 
OR at the 1% significance level. The implication is that firms misclassify other revenues as 
core revenues in the pre-IFRS period. Their post-IFRS behavior is explained by the 
coefficient on the OR×IFRS variable. The coefficient is significantly negative at the 1% 
significance level for unexpected core revenues indicating that firms engage in revenue 
                                                          
62
 Table 2 shows that adjusted R
2
 is 0.039 (3.9%). Although it is quite low, it is larger than those reported in 
existing classification shifting studies (e.g. Fan and Liu, 2015; McVay, 2006). 
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reclassification to a greater extent after mandatory IFRS adoption, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. The coefficient for OR is -0.039 for the pre-IFRS period and -0.097 (-0.039-
0.058) for the post-IFRS period which demonstrates that IFRS adoption increases the use of 
revenue shifting. This suggests that mandatory IFRS adoption enhances the scope for 
revenue reclassification which supports the Zalata and Roberts (2015) findings that IFRS 
allow firms more managerial discretion on the classification of income statement items.  
4.4.3 Firms with strong incentives and revenue reclassification   
The results for testing whether firms conducting SEOs, firms in financial distress, firms 
with acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and firms reporting small core 
earnings or small increases in core earnings engage in revenue reclassification to a greater 
extent are presented in Table 4.4, columns (1) to (5), respectively. 
                                                          [Table 4.4 around here] 
Column (1) shows a negative relationship between unexpected core revenues and the 
OR×SEO interaction variable at the 1% significance level which implies that firms employ 
revenue reclassification to a greater extent at the time of SEOs.
63
 Thus, Hypothesis 3A is 
supported. The coefficient on the OR×DISTRESS interaction variable is both significant and 
negative at the 5% significance level as indicated in column (2). This suggests that firms in 
financial distress use more revenue reclassification, in line with Hypothesis 3B. Firms with 
acquisitions financed by share for share exchange use revenue reclassification to a greater 
extent in the year before the takeover as the coefficient on the OR×AC interaction variable is 
significantly negative in column (3). This supports Hypothesis 3C. Columns (4) and (5) 
show significantly negative coefficients on the OR×MBZ_CE and OR×MBP_CE interaction 
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 Further analysis shows that the mean (median) of other revenues is significantly lower for SEO firms than 
other firms. This implies that SEO firms shift more other revenues to core revenues than their counterparts.  
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variables at the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The implication is that firms 
reporting small core earnings or small increases in core earnings engage in revenue 
reclassification to a greater degree. These findings are consistent with Hypotheses 3D and 
3E. Overall, it appears that revenue reclassification is more pervasive among firms with high 
managerial incentives which support the studies that find similar results with regard to other 
earnings management methods (e.g. Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Fan & Liu, 2015).                                 
4.5  Robustness checks   
4.5.1  Alternative core revenues expectation model 
I use prior year’s core revenues, prior year’s trade receivables and current year’s trade 
receivables to measure expected core revenues in the main analysis. However, there may be 
other factors that affect core revenues and the omission of these factors may influence my 
main results. These factors include the change in inventories and the change in property, 
plant, and equipment. Thomas and Zhang (2002) document firms with inventory increases 
have higher growth in core revenues over the prior five years and this trend reverses after the 
change in inventory.  Regarding the change in property, plant, and equipment, an increase in 
such assets in year t-1 is likely boost core revenues in year t. This is because firms may buy 
new fixed assets to increase production in the following year. Thus, I test the validity of my 
main results by adding the change in inventories in year t-1 and the change in property, plant 
and equipment in year t-1 to my core revenues expectation model.
64
 I, then, re-estimate the 
model to calculate unexpected core revenues. The results are presented in Table 4.5.  
                                                  [Table 4.5 around here] 
                                                          
64
 My results do not alter if I use the change in capital expenditures in year t-1 rather than the change in 
property, plant, and equipment in year t-1. 
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 The findings indicate that firms reclassify other revenues as core revenues, in line with 
revenue reclassification. This suggests that my main findings are not sensitive to the 
alternative core revenues expectation model.  
4.5.2  Excluding the financial crisis period 
A number of studies have argued that the recent financial crisis might impact upon the 
results of any given study that has a timeframe which includes the crisis period. In the 
earnings management literature existing studies provide inconclusive results on the use of 
earnings management during the financial crisis period. Strobl (2013) developed a model 
which suggested that earnings management practices mostly occur during booms and this is 
consistent with the empirical evidence which shows that firms engage in more earnings 
management during economic expansion than during economic recession (Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2007). Similarly, Filip and Raffournier (2014) found that European companies 
including UK ones decreased discretionary accruals during the 2008-2009 financial crisis 
period.  Nevertheless, some other studies have found significantly contrary results especially, 
during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. For instance, Saleh and Ahmed (2005) found that 
Malaysian firms engaged in income-decreasing earnings management to obtain financial 
support from the government during economic recession.  
As my sample spans the recent financial crisis period, the results of the main analysis 
may have been influenced by the financial crisis period. To test this I exclude the crisis 
period (2008-2011) from the sample and re-run the main regression. The results are 
presented in Table 4.6.  
                                                [Table 4.6 around here] 
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It shows that firms engage in revenue reclassification as the coefficient on OR is both 
significant and negative. This implies that excluding the financial crisis period appears to 
make no difference to my main results.    
4.6 Conclusions  
This paper is the first to examine revenue reclassification as an earnings management 
tool using a large sample of 13,915 UK listed firm-year observations for the 1995-2014 
period. First, it tests whether firms shift other revenues to core revenues. Firms have 
incentives to employ this manipulation method as financial statement users value income 
statement line items differently and they give more value to the core revenues item or those 
close to it (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Davis, 2002). Furthermore, an increase in core 
revenues is more valued by investors than a decrease in core expenses (Ertimur, Livnat, & 
Martikainen, 2003; Marguardt & Wiedman, 2004). I find that firms engage in revenue 
reclassification to inflate core revenues, in line with the incentives for increasing such top 
income statement line item.  
Second, it examines revenue reclassification in the UK setting both under UK GAAP 
and IFRS to determine which of these standards offer broader scope for such earnings 
management method. IFRS is likely to enhance the scope for revenue shifting especially due 
to the more flexible requirements for other revenues such as non-recurring items compared 
to UK GAAP. Consistent with this expectation, my results show firms employ revenue 
reclassification under UK GAAP and mandatory IFRS adoption increases this practice. 
Overall, the results suggest that the scope for revenue reclassification depends on the 
accounting standards in operation at the time. 
My supplementary tests indicate that firms with high incentives such as those 
conducting seasoned equity offerings, those in financial distress, those with acquisitions 
financed by share for share exchange, and those reporting small core earnings or small 
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increases in core earnings employ revenue reclassification to a greater degree. I acknowledge 
that there are also other categories of firms (e.g. firms conducting initial public offerings 
(Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998)) with high incentives that may use revenue reclassification to 
a greater extent. It is also possible that strong corporate governance or firms audited by big 
four audit firms are deterred from engaging in revenue reclassification but I leave the 



















    
127 
 
                                                       Table 4.1 
                                                  Summary Statistics 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Variables  N Mean   25
th
  Median 75
th
  Std. Dev 
       
CRi,t 13,915 1.409 0.723 1.193 1.804 0.995 
CRi,t-1 13,915 1.470 0.756 1.230 1.868 1.064 
TRi,t 13,915 0.241 0.102 0.198 0.323 0.197 
TRi,t-1 13,915 0.257 0.106 0.207 0.337 0.222 
UE_CRi,t 13,915 0.000 -0.126 -0.006 0.118 0.291 
ORi,t 13,915 -0.159 -0.132 -0.055 -0.022 0.334 
ROAi,t 13,915 -0.002 -0.018 0.042 0.088 0.202 
LEVi,t   13,915 0.221 0.047 0.171 0.310 0.233 
NOAi,t-1 13,915 0.591 0.380 0.580 0.750 0.421 
SIZEi,t-1 13,915 4.409 2.984 4.285 5.760 2.029 
CLi,t 13,915 0.304 0.181 0.275 0.387 0.175 
       
Notes: 
CRi,t is core revenues, TRi,t is trade receivables, UE_CRi,t is unexpected core 
revenues, ORi,t is other revenues, ROAi,t, is return on asset, LEVi,t  is leverage ratio, 
NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets, SIZEi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the lagged total 
















                                                    Table 4.2 




















Adjusted R-squared 0.039 
Notes: 
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard 
errors clustered by year. UE_CRi,t is unexpected core 
revenues, ORi,t is other revenues, ROAi,t, is return on 
asset, LEVi,t  is leverage ratio, NOAi,t-1 is net operating 
assets, SIZEi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the lagged 
total assets and CLi,t is ratio of current liabilities.  
 ***/**/* 
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                                                   Table 4.3 
                                Revenue reclassification and IFRS adoption 
  






















Adjusted R-squared 0.040 
Notes: 
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard 
errors clustered by year. UE_CRi,t is unexpected core 
revenues, ORi,t is other revenues, IFRSi,t is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one for the years after 2005 and 
zero otherwise, ROAi,t, is return on asset, LEVi,t  is 
leverage ratio, NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets, SIZEi,t-1 is 
the natural logarithm of the lagged total assets and CLi,t is 
ratio of current liabilities.  
***/**/* 
indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed). 
 
 




                                                                Table 4.4 
                               Revenue reclassification and firms with high incentives  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables        UE_CRi,t UE_CRi,t UE_CRi,t UE_CRi,t UE_CRi,t 
      
ORi,t -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (-3.719) (-4.921) (-6.244) (-6.665) (-6.033) 
SEOi,t 0.005     
 (0.680)     
ORi,t × SEOi,t -0.077***     
 (-3.115)     
DISTRESSi,t  0.022***    
  (4.297)    
ORi,t × DISTRESSi,t  -0.041**    
  (-2.768)    
ACi,t   0.003   
   (0.128)   
ORi,t × ACi,t   -0.092*   
   (-1.902)   
MBZ_CEi,t    -0.048  
    (-1.426)  
ORi,t × MBZ_CEi,t    -0.234**  
    (-2.701)  
MBP_CEi,t     -0.004 
     (-0.221) 
ORi,t × MBP_CEi,t     -0.140* 
     (-1.837) 
ROAi,t 0.165*** 0.175*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 
 (10.075) (9.766) (8.488) (8.611) (8.573) 
LEVi,t   0.039** 0.035* 0.043** 0.044** 0.044** 
 (2.246) (2.020) (2.495) (2.585) (2.582) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071*** 
 (-5.815) (-5.760) (-5.755) (-5.789) (-5.785) 
SIZEi,t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 (-1.258) (-1.351) (-2.009) (-1.969) (-2.037) 
CLi,t 0.166*** 0.148*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 
 (6.980) (6.073) (6.934) (6.932) (6.982) 
Constant -0.020 -0.020 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 
 (-1.389) (-1.457) (-1.102) (-1.125) (-1.143) 
      
Observations 13,915 13,915 13,915 13,915 13,915 




t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by year. UE_CRi,t is 
unexpected core revenues, ORi,t is other revenues, SEOi,t is equal to one for firm-years that are 
in the top quartile of the percentage increase in common stock and zero otherwise, 
DISTRESSi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have negative Z scores and zero otherwise, 
ACi,t is equal to one in the year before the takeover and zero otherwise, MBZ_CEi,t is equal to 
one for firm-years that have core earnings of between 0 and 0.005, and zero otherwise, 
MBP_CEi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have an increase in core earnings of between 0 
and 0.005, and zero otherwise, ROAi,t, is return on asset, LEVi,t  is leverage ratio, NOAi,t-1 is net 
operating assets, SIZEi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the lagged total assets and CLi,t is ratio of 
current liabilities.  
 ***/**/* 
indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed). 
 
                                  
















                                                    Table 4.5 
                               Validity of the core revenues expectation model  
  


















Adjusted R-squared 0.029 
Notes: 
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors 
clustered by year. UE_CRi,t is unexpected core revenues, 
ORi,t is other revenues, ROAi,t, is return on asset, LEVi,t  is 
leverage ratio, NOAi,t-1 is net operating assets, SIZEi,t-1 is 
the natural logarithm of the lagged total assets and CLi,t is 
ratio of current liabilities.   
***/**/* 










                                                  Table 4.6 
                                   Revenue reclassification: Excluding crisis period 
  


















Adjusted R-squared 0.038 
                           Notes: 
t- statistics (in parentheses) based on robust standard 
errors clustered by year. UE_CRi,t is unexpected core 
revenues, ORi,t is other revenues, ROAi,t, is return on 
asset, LEVi,t  is leverage ratio, NOAi,t-1 is net operating 
assets, SIZEi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the lagged 
total assets and CLi,t is ratio of current liabilities.  
                                       ***/**/* 















This thesis comprises three essays in earnings management using UK-based data 
samples. The first (Chapter 2) implements a first test of the debt covenant hypothesis for the 
UK. Specifically, it examines whether UK firms manage earnings to avoid debt covenant 
violations. The extant studies have tested this hypothesis in the context of the USA. Chapter 
3 examines whether SEOs affect the debt covenant hypothesis. The latter is likely to be 
affected by this corporate event but this has not been tested in the literature. Finally, Chapter 
4 is the first to examine revenue reclassification as an earnings management tool. It tests 
whether firms shift other revenues to core revenues and whether this behavior changes after 
IFRS. The main results along with their implications are summarized in the following 
sections.  
5.2 The debt covenant hypothesis 
Chapter 2 implements a first test of the debt covenant hypothesis for the UK. It 
examines whether firms close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants use 
more real activities manipulation and/or accruals management than firms far from violation. 
The debt covenant hypothesis has often been tested using small or large US samples 
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(DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Dichev and Skinner 2002; Franz et al. 2014). UK studies 
(Citron 1992; Moir and Sudarsanam 2007) do not directly test the debt covenant hypothesis 
because UK-based firms are not obliged by company law to disclose detailed covenant 
information unlike their US-based counterparts. I use carefully estimated covenant slack 
proxies to overcome the UK data problem motivated by the common use of covenants in 
loan contracts and by the covenant convergence between the USA and UK.  
The results for testing the debt covenant hypothesis for the UK indicate that firms close 
to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) covenants 
engage in higher levels of RAM rather than AM relative to firms far from violation. These 
findings strongly supports the debt covenant hypothesis and suggests a switch from AM to 
RAM, consistent with those of Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu (2015) and Kothari, Mizik, and 
Roychowdhury (2016) for the USA. I also find that mandatory IFRS adoption does not 
change the use of RAM for firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest 
coverage covenants. However, it increases the propensity for employing RAM for firm close 
to default of their debt to EBITDA covenants.  
5.3 SEOs and the debt covenant hypothesis 
Chapter 3 examines whether SEOs affect the debt covenant hypothesis. It tests whether 
SEO firms’ real activities manipulation practices change to avoid covenant violations in the 
post-issue period relative to the pre-issue period. SEOs are likely to strengthen financial 
statement numbers which may reduce the risk of breaching debt covenants.  The latter, 
however, has not been tested empirically by the existing studies. 
The findings for the effect of SEOs on the debt covenant hypothesis show that the use of 
real activities manipulation to avoid the possibility of interest coverage covenant violations 
decreases from the pre-issue period to the post-issue period for SEO firms relative to the 
corresponding change for benchmark firms. This implies that firms improve their financial 
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situation using SEO proceeds and, in the process, become less susceptible to debt covenant 
violations following SEOs. The results also show that the decrease in the use of real 
activities manipulation in the post SEO period to avoid the likelihood of breaching interest 
coverage covenant is more pervasive among SEO firms with low market to book ratios or 
high financial leverage. Furthermore, using accruals management and classification shifting 
measures of earnings management I find that firms do not engage in these manipulation 
methods to avoid the possibility of interest coverage covenant violations and this behaviour 
does not change following SEOs.  
5.4 Revenue reclassification before and after IFRS 
Chapter 4 extends the classification shifting literature by being the first to examine 
revenue reclassification. Specifically, it tests whether firms shift other revenues to core 
revenues and whether this behavior changes after IFRS. This is motivated by several reasons 
such as the belief that an increase in core revenues is more valued by investors than a 
decrease in core expenses (Ertimur et. 2003; Marguardt and Wiedman 2004). 
The results for testing the revenue reclassification as an earnings management tool 
indicate that unexpected core revenues increase as other revenues decrease. This provides 
evidence that firms shift other revenues to core revenues, consistent with revenue 
reclassification. The results show that firms engage in such activities to a greater extent after 
mandatory IFRS adoption suggesting that the latter offers more latitude for these practices. 
This supports Zalata and Roberts (2015) who document that IFRS allows firms to have more 
managerial discretion on classification of non-recurring items.  
I also analyze whether firms with strong incentives use revenue reclassification to a 
greater extent. Existing studies document firms that make SEOs, are in financial distress, 
make acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and meet certain earnings 
benchmarks have high incentives to engage in earnings management. Marguardt and 
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Wiedman (2004) find that firms that plan to make equity offerings inflate sales by employing 
accruals management. A similar result is found by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) with regard to 
using real earnings management to overestimate sales in the year of the SEOs. Fan and Liu 
(2015) find that firms shift core expenses both from the cost of goods sold and selling, 
general and administrative expenses to income-decreasing special items for meeting/beating 
zero core earnings and prior period core earnings. As revenue reclassification is likely to 
inflate core revenues and core earnings, I expect that firms conducting SEOs, firms in 
financial distress, firms with acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and firms 
reporting small core earnings or small increases in core earnings employ revenue 
reclassification to a greater degree. My results are consistent with this expectation, 
suggesting that revenue reclassification is more pervasive among firms with strong 
incentives.  
5.5 Future research  
The thesis suggests some avenues for future research which could potentially shed new 
light on issues in earnings management. In Chapter 2, I use carefully calibrated covenant 
slack proxies to test the debt covenant hypothesis for the UK because UK-based firms are 
not obliged by company law to disclose covenant information. Future research could conduct 
interviews and surveys to determine more clearly what accounting-based debt covenants are 
now frequently used in the UK and whether their use decreases after IFRS adoption. Given 
that I test the debt covenant hypothesis using real activities manipulation and accruals 
management methods of earnings management, future research should also test whether 
firms engage in classification shifting to avoid debt covenant violations. It could also 
examine whether firms use earnings management methods jointly or separately to remain 
within debt covenant limits.   
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Chapter 3 documents that SEO firms decrease managing earnings to avoid covenant 
violations in the post-issue period compared to the pre-issue period using a sample which is 
mainly based on private placements. Future research should also focus on the other types of 
SEOs such as rights issues to examine whether firms’ earnings management practices change 
for this purpose in the post-issue period relative to the pre-issue period. In particular, it 
would be interesting to investigate which types of SEOs induce change in the use of earnings 
management to remain within covenant limits in the post-issue period.  
Given that this thesis has examined revenue reclassification using a UK-based sample in 
Chapter 4, future research could analyze US firms to determine whether they engage in this 
earnings management method. Furthermore, this thesis calls for future research to test 
whether firms employ revenue reclassification and expense reclassification jointly or 
separately. Future research should also examine whether other factors such as strong 
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